1994
DOI: 10.1080/10510979409368422
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What sort of terms ought theories of human action incorporate?

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Cited by 9 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The uniplanar characterization (i.e., a focus on a single level of what is, in fact, a hierarchy of representational system^),^ emerges in a variety of forms in models of message production. It can be discerned most clearly in models that restrict analysis to those aspects of message behavior that correspond to relatively abstract act-types such as are captured in our everyday conceptions of our own and others' behavior (e.g., "promising," "asking a favor," "telling a joke," and so on; see Greene, 1994). More generally, it appears any time focus is restricted to an idea unit or utterance representation with no explicit provision for lower level mechanisms for actually instantiating these more abstract behavioral features.…”
Section: Variations On the Uniplanar Themementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The uniplanar characterization (i.e., a focus on a single level of what is, in fact, a hierarchy of representational system^),^ emerges in a variety of forms in models of message production. It can be discerned most clearly in models that restrict analysis to those aspects of message behavior that correspond to relatively abstract act-types such as are captured in our everyday conceptions of our own and others' behavior (e.g., "promising," "asking a favor," "telling a joke," and so on; see Greene, 1994). More generally, it appears any time focus is restricted to an idea unit or utterance representation with no explicit provision for lower level mechanisms for actually instantiating these more abstract behavioral features.…”
Section: Variations On the Uniplanar Themementioning
confidence: 99%
“…As we shall see, the bulk of scientific realist explanation in communication stops at the psychological level, which is somewhat consistent with Harre ("the new paradigm emphasizes the role of cognitive processes in the genesis of action," 1974, p. 150) and not necessarily inconsistent with Taylor and Toulmin. A second challenge singular to the social and behavioral sciences that is particularly relevant to communication scholarship concerns the status of functional explanatory forms. As will be discussed below, realist explanation in communication science is ideally achieved through accounts of the causal impact of individual-level psychological structures .and processes (Greene, 1994). However, as Greene notes, a complete account for communication also requires a social component.…”
Section: Challenges To Scientific Realismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Not so with those who have adopted cognitive psychological concepts for their communication theory. Relevant metatheory (Greene, 1994;Planalp & Hewes, 1981) takes an explicitly realist stance, but cognitive communication theory has not been consistent with this commitment. Proposed cognitive structures relevant to declarative knowledge have included schema (Planalp, 1985), prototypes (Ray, 1986), and implicit theories (Pavitt & Haight, 1986); those relevant to procedural knowledge have included plans (Berger, 1995), MOPS (Kellermann, 1995), and procedural records (Greene, 1995).…”
Section: Scientific Realism and Communication Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One consequence of this approach has been that evidence for the models appearing in our literature is indirect, relying on inferences about internal processes drawn from observations of output (e.g., memory tests, response latencies). Although considerable progress in the explication of the cognitive processes involved in message planning has been made through cognitivist analysis, Greene (1994) and others (e.g., Beatty & McCroskey, 1998;Cappella, 1991) have argued that a fuller understanding of message production could be gained by integrating physiological, especially neurological, processes into theoretical models. Dillard et al (2002) described the distinguishing characteristic of cognitive models as ''their interest in the thought processes that precede and accompany communication' ' (p. 437).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A substantial corpus of scholarship attempting to describe the constitutive processes of message planning has appeared in the social interaction literature (Berger, 1995, 1997, 2002; Berger & Bell, 1988; Berger & diBattista, 1992; Berger, Karol, & Jordan, 1989; Dillard, Anderson, & Knobloch, 2002; Greene, 1994, 1995, 1997; Greene, O’Hair, Cody, & Yen, 1985; Hample & Dallinger, 1990, 1998; Infante, 1980; Kellermann, 1991, 1995; Kellermann, Broetzmann, Lim, & Kitao, 1989; Kellermann & Lim, 1990; Knowlton & Berger, 1997; Meyer, 1990, 1994, 1996, 1997; Plax, Beatty, & Feingold, 1991; Waldron, 1990; Waldron & Applegate, 1994; Wilson, 1990, 1995). In contrast to message production models crafted by cognitive neuroscientists (e.g., Indefrey & Levelt, 2000), theoretical treatments in the communication literature are almost exclusively cognitivist in perspective.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%