Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance

Stefánsson, H. Orri

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02455-8

Cited by 7 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(36 reference statements)

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“…Debates about appropriate epistemic states (e.g., Buchak 2017;Stefánsson 2019) and decision-theoretic principles (e.g., Kurtulmuş 2012;Liang 2017;Gustafsson 2018) behind the veil remain active. Stefánsson (2019), for example, considers ambiguity averse preferences behind the veil, and finds such preferences support a form of egalitarianism. Liang (2017), to take another example, employs cumulative prospect theory and finds an optimal form of inequality.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncertainty, equality, fraternity

Stewart

2021

Synthese

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Epistemic states of uncertainty play important roles in ethical and political theorizing. Theories that appeal to a “veil of ignorance,” for example, analyze fairness or impartiality in terms of certain states of ignorance. It is important, then, to scrutinize proposed conceptions of ignorance and explore promising alternatives in such contexts. Here, I study Lerner’s probabilistic egalitarian theorem in the setting of imprecise probabilities. Lerner’s theorem assumes that a social planner tasked with distributing income to individuals in a population is “completely ignorant” about which utility functions belong to which individuals. Lerner models this ignorance with a certain uniform probability distribution, and shows that, under certain further assumptions, income should be equally distributed. Much of the criticism of the relevance of Lerner’s result centers on the representation of ignorance involved. Imprecise probabilities provide a general framework for reasoning about various forms of uncertainty including, in particular, ignorance. To what extent can Lerner’s conclusion be maintained in this setting?

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncertainty, equality, fraternity

Stewart

2021

Synthese

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“…Drawing onHecht's (2021) argument below (intended, by Hecht, only to apply when the patient's risk attitude is unknown), a decision-maker may claim, in certain circumstances involving vulnerable patients, "I cannot afford for it to happen on my watch that you are deprived of having at least the chance of a minimally decent life. "11 Also seeStefansson (2021) who treats ambiguity aversion as another kind of risk aversion and extends the 'risk principle' to include it, to derive egalitarianism from behind the veil of ignorance.12 Moreover, this justification for the risk principle seems to be question-begging for the purposes of Buchak's (2017a) derivation of prioritarianism from behind the veil of ignorance.…”

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“…11 11 Also see Stefansson (2021) who treats ambiguity aversion as another kind of risk aversion and extends the ‘risk principle’ to include it, to derive egalitarianism from behind the veil of ignorance. …”

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“…While my discussion is primarily aimed at those who accept that rationality is permissive under risk, some of the discussion also illuminates the choice between required and deferential still faced by those who reject the permissiveness of rationality under risk.9 Note, however, that Buchak and Bovens concur in the need to err on the side of risk aversion when the patient's attitude to risk is not known, as discussed below.10 Drawing onHecht's (2021) argument below (intended, by Hecht, only to apply when the patient's risk attitude is unknown), a decision-maker may claim, in certain circumstances involving vulnerable patients, "I cannot afford for it to happen on my watch that you are deprived of having at least the chance of a minimally decent life. "11 Also seeStefansson (2021) who treats ambiguity aversion as another kind of risk aversion and extends the 'risk principle' to include it, to derive egalitarianism from behind the veil of ignorance.…”

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Taking Risks on Behalf of Another

Thoma

2023

Philosophy Compass

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A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any of the rationally permissible risk attitudes, is there some specific risk attitude that is required when choosing for others, or are we required to defer to the risk attitudes of the people on whose behalf we are choosing? This article elaborates on this question, explains its wider practical and theoretical significance, provides an overview of existing answers, and explores how to go about providing a more systematic account of how to choose on behalf of others in risky contexts. Introduction: Permissiveness of Rationality under RiskA growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk in the following sense. Consider a decision problem under risk: There is an agent who faces a choice between a number of different options. She values the different potential outcomes of her choice to different extents, but she does not know for sure what outcome each of the options available to her will bring about. She can, however, assign probabilities to how likely different outcomes are to come about as a consequence of the available options. Those who believe that rationality is permissive under risk grant that rational agents are free to make such risky choices in more or less riskaverse or risk-inclined ways. If rationality is permissive under risk, then the probabilities assigned to the potential outcomes, along with knowing the extent to which the agent values the outcomes do not fix how she should rationally choose.The following example illustrates this idea. Suppose you have to choose between two different medical treatments to undergo for a life-threatening condition. These treatments do not affect the quality of your life, and you moreover judge each of your remaining years

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“…SeeHarsanyi (1953Harsanyi ( , 1955Harsanyi ( , 1977,Rawls (1971Rawls ( [1999),Buchak (2017),Moehler (2018) andStefansson (2021).Economics & Philosophy…”

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confidence: 99%

When utilitarianism dominates justice as fairness: an economic defence of utilitarianism from the original position

Chung

2022

Economics and Philosophy

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The original position together with the veil of ignorance have served as one of the main methodological devices to justify principles of distributive justice. Most approaches to this topic have primarily focused on the single person decision-theoretic aspect of the original position. This paper, in contrast, will directly model the basic structure and the economic agents therein to project the economic consequences and social outcomes generated either by utilitarianism or Rawls’s two principles of justice. It will be shown that when the differences in people’s productive abilities are sufficiently great, utilitarianism dominates Rawls’s two principles of justice by providing a higher level of overall well-being to every member of society. Whenever this is the case, the parties can rely on the Principle of Dominance (which is a direct implication of instrumental rationality) to choose utilitarianism over Rawls’s two principles of justice. Furthermore, when this is so, utilitarianism is free from one of its most fundamental criticisms that it ‘does not take seriously the distinction between persons’ (Rawls 1971 [1999]: 24).

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Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance

Cited by 7 publications

References 32 publications

Uncertainty, equality, fraternity

Uncertainty, equality, fraternity

Taking Risks on Behalf of Another

When utilitarianism dominates justice as fairness: an economic defence of utilitarianism from the original position

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