Alternative routes: Intergovernmental relations in Canada and Australia

Collins, Emmet

doi:10.1111/capa.12147

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…In recent years institutions have arisen to facilitate interprovincial coordination, cooperation and concerted action on issues difficult to address under a more traditional interpretation of constitutional relations and powers. The Council of the Federation, representing Canada's thirteen premiers, coordinates activities to facilitate outcomes with or without the direct involvement of the federal government (Collins ). Working groups – consisting of Premiers acting jointly on issues like health care, economic productivity, innovation, and fiscal arrangements – have driven change on many issues under provincial jurisdiction, and occasionally even in areas traditionally considered federal, such as indigenous affairs .…”

Section: Multilevel Governance In a Canadian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Canadian governance in transition: Multilevel governance in the digital era

Cargnello¹,

Flumian²

2017

Can Public Adm

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While the digital revolution has created new pressures and tensions for governing institutions in Canada, a broad discussion of the evolution of the Canadian Westminster governance ecosystem has yet to occur in earnest. The article seeks to contribute to such a discussion. We identify three related trends shaping the Canadian governance context: the rise of digital culture, the disintermediation of traditional authorities, and the increasingly distributed nature of governance. We then draw on scholarly literature surrounding "multilevel governance" to help contextualize these trends, and identify key tensions and needs related to the increasingly pressing imperative to develop a "made-in-Canada" governance approach that is well attuned to the needs of the digital era. We conclude by suggesting that such an approach will require a new style of leadership, one that privileges agility and resilience and that is issue-based and outcome-focused, rather than constrained by jurisdictional silos or narrowly conceived institutional mandates.Sommaire : Alors qu'au Canada, la r evolution num erique a cr ee de nouvelles pressions et tensions au sein des institutions gouvernementales, on attend toujours un s erieux d ebat concernant l' evolution de l' ecosystème de gouvernance de style Westminster canadien. Cet article vise a contribuer a ce d ebat. Nous identifions trois tendances reli ees qui influencent le contexte de gouvernance au Canada : l'essor de la culture num erique, la d esinterm ediation des autorit es traditionnelles, et la nature de gouvernance de plus en plus r epartie. Ensuite, nous nous appuyons sur les ecrits universitaires concernant la « gouvernance a multiples niveaux » afin de contextualiser ces tendances, et d'identifier les tensions et besoins cl es li es a l'imp eratif croissant d' etablir une approche de la gouvernance « fabriqu ee au Canada », qui soit adapt ee aux exigences de l'ère num erique. Nous concluons en proposant qu'une telle approche exige un nouveau style de leadership : un qui privil egie l'agilit e et la r esilience et qui soit ax e sur les enjeux et les r esultats, plutôt que d'être contraint par des cloisonnements de comp etences ou des mandats institutionnels conçus de manière restrictive.

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Section: Multilevel Governance In a Canadian Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Canadian governance in transition: Multilevel governance in the digital era

Cargnello¹,

Flumian²

2017

Can Public Adm

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Australia’s councils are generally regarded as failing to produce reliable intergovernmental interactions ( Carroll and Head 2010 ; Collins 2015 ; Tiernan 2008 ). COAG—Australia’s peak council under which several, periodically remodeled, ministerial councils operated—lacked formalization and was “simply the occasional summit meetings of first ministers from across Australia rather than an ‘institution’ in any meaningful sense” ( Phillimore and Fenna 2017 , 6).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Intergovernmental Coordination during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Responses in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland

Schnabel

Hegele

2021

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

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The COVID-19 pandemic required prompt action from governments all over the world. In federal systems, it can be important or beneficial to coordinate crisis management between the various governments. The extent to which intergovernmental coordination occurred and the form it took (vertical or horizontal) varied across countries and regarding the measures taken. By examining the introduction and the subsequent easing of containment measures and the procurement of medical supplies in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, this article identifies the circumstances under which intergovernmental coordination occurs. Surprisingly, the existence of strong intergovernmental councils did not lead to closer intergovernmental coordination. Governments coordinated more intensively when jurisdiction was shared, problem pressure was high, and measures were(re-)distributive in nature. Vertical coordination was more likely when vertical intergovernmental councils existed and powers were shared.

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“…Recently, New Brunswick entered into a formal agreement with the government of Nova Scotia to officially expand the jurisdiction of SIRT to New Brunswick (Office of the Premier, Justice and Public Safety, 2021), making it a joint provincial agency. The collaboration between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia is an example of horizontal intergovernmental relations and collaboration (Collins, 2015), a practice sometimes necessary for smaller provinces lacking sufficient financial capacity to independently offer a program or policy like larger provinces. Currently 3 territorial governments do not operate their own SIRT agencies and must rely on an agency or police force from another jurisdiction.…”

Section: Agency Creation: the Expansion Of The Civilian Oversight Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oversight and accountability for serious incidents in Canada: Who polices the police?

Puddister

2023

Can Public Adm

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This study examines the agencies responsible for investigating when a member of the public is seriously injured, is killed or experiences other serious and potentially criminal actions at the hands of police officers in Canada. The article takes a comprehensive approach by examining all police oversight agencies that are responsible for responding to and investigating allegations of police criminality—eight organizations, across nine jurisdictions. The study integrates insights from public administration and police accountability literature and examines the structures and administration of the agencies. The study provides a critical assessment of the state of police oversight for serious incidents in Canada, it identifies agency outputs (including case substantiation), levels of independence, efforts at transparency, and considers the challenges in attempting to hold police accountable in Canada.

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Alternative routes: Intergovernmental relations in Canada and Australia

Cited by 7 publications

References 25 publications

Canadian governance in transition: Multilevel governance in the digital era

Canadian governance in transition: Multilevel governance in the digital era

Explaining Intergovernmental Coordination during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Responses in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland

Oversight and accountability for serious incidents in Canada: Who polices the police?

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