Allocation of decision rights in joint ventures

Windsperger, Josef

doi:10.1002/mde.1464

Cited by 15 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 78 publications

(86 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…According to the property rights approach, intangibility (non-contractibility) of knowledge assets results in allocating residual decision rights to the network partners (Aghion et al 2004;Lerner and Malmendier 2010;Windsperger 2009). The relationship between the intangibility of knowledge assets and the degree of contractual completeness can be stated by the following proposition: The higher the intangibility of the partner-specific knowledge, the greater is the difficulty for the franchisor to explicitly specify the use of system-specific and local market knowhow in the contract, the lower is the ratio between specific and residual decision rights, and hence the lower is the degree of contractual completeness.…”

Section: Property Rights Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising

Hendrikse¹,

Windsperger

2010

Contributions to Management Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

AND KEYWORDS AbstractThe aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of governance. The degree of contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty Determinants of Contractual Completeness in FranchisingGeorge Hendrikse and Josef Windsperger * Abstract. The aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of governance. The degree of contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty (negatively), trust (positively), franchisees' specific investments (negatively), environmental uncertainty (negatively), intangibility of system specific know-how (negatively) and contract design capabilities (positively). The hypotheses are tested with a data base consisting of 52 franchise systems in Austria. The empirical results support the hypotheses regarding behavioural uncertainty, trust and intangible systemspecific know-how.

show abstract

Section: Property Rights Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising

Hendrikse¹,

Windsperger

2010

Contributions to Management Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Though there is scarce research on the link between allocation of decision rights and performance in networks (Windsperger ), we expect that, due to the local network partners’ higher local information processing capacity and entrepreneurial orientation, delegating decision rights to local network partners (that is, franchisees), will lead to better decisions for both the franchisor and franchisees, which in turn leads to higher performance. The positive impact of decentralization on performance is compatible with results of Kidwell, Nygaard, and Silkoset ().…”

Section: Research Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust, Decision Rights Delegation, and Performance-The Case of Franchising

Herz¹,

Hutzinger

Seferagic

et al. 2016

Journal of Small Business Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Previous research has not examined the relationship between trust, decentralization, and franchisor performance. Complementary to the literature on autonomy and relational governance from franchisees' perspective, this study focuses on the franchisor's perspective on the impact of decentralization and trust on performance. Consistent with the embeddedness view, the results show that trust is a facilitator of decentralization in franchise networks, thereby increasing the positive performance effect of decision rights delegation. Overall, the study offers a new perspective on the relationship between formal governance-through decision rights allocation-and trust as a relational variable in interorganizational networks.

show abstract

“…Our measure (core) is valued at 1 if the task descriptions match any part of the agency mission, and 0 otherwise. The measure is similar to intangible knowledge assets constructed by Gurcaylilar-Yenidogan and Windsperger (2013) and Windsperger (2009).…”

Section: Applicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deciding who’s in charge

Malatesta

Smith

2015

Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This research derives testable hypotheses from property rights theory regarding the allocation of decision authority in contracts. Government-based professional service contracts provide the context for study. Using content analysis we code 361 contracts to identify the main contributors of knowledge assets to the work product along with the relevant decision authority, which is reflected in provisions that stipulate who must accomplish the work and how it must be done. Results of various regression models show that the distribution of knowledge assets does influence the assignment of decision authority, specifically: (1) a higher fraction of decision rights is allocated to government when government is also identified as a source of expertise; (2) authority is less centralized when both parties contribute knowledge inputs; (3) bargaining power (lobbying) leads to a lower fraction of decision rights allocated to government.

show abstract

Allocation of decision rights in joint ventures

Cited by 15 publications

References 78 publications

Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising

Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising

Trust, Decision Rights Delegation, and Performance-The Case of Franchising

Deciding who’s in charge

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About