Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century. The Washington NATO Project

Abstract

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A case of unmet expectations: Portugal and the South Atlantic

“…Opposition to the treatment of the Atlantic as a whole came across loud and clear and especially so given that it came at the moment Brazil started to reconnect with the South Atlantic on multiple levels -political, economic and strategic. 10 Hence, outside proposals, coincidental to Portuguese objectives for NATO's strategic concept that emphasized the development of an Atlantic Basin or an Atlantic Rim, were easily interpreted as being associated with the concerted drive behind NATO's alleged expansion plans (Hamilton and Burwell 2009;Hamilton, Barry, Binnendijk et al 2009;Lesser 2010). By appearing to contribute to the notion of solutions that were made in the north and imposed in the south without its involvement, and by reaffirming the non-inclusion of the South Atlantic's leading organizations in any kind of solution, whether regional-political or security-related, such proposals only added insult to injury from a Brazilian point of view.…”

NATO's Intervention in the Afghan Civil War

“…25 These reforms have not, however, created a deployable NATO command structure; the Alliance still relies upon 'the creation of ad hoc headquarters' in the theatre of operations, 'while large staffs sit almost idle at fixed locations in Europe'. 26 Further, the NATO command structure still competes with national commands, a problem that plagued ISAF until 2006. At American insistence, OEF-A and ISAF were formally kept separate even though their missions were complementary.…”

US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why their Withdrawal is Desirable and Feasible

“…57 The United States, however, prefers the European host nations to take the initiative. 58 If the European host nations asked for them to be withdrawn, the United States would not resist. Even the US military -which is responsible for these weapons in Europe on a day-to-day basis -would like to see them removed.…”