Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game

Szolnoki, Attila; Chen, Xiaojie

doi:10.1103/physreve.95.052316

Cited by 102 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 52 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…where k c gives the number of neighboring cooperators of a defector with k neighbors [20]. Note that h, t and g are constant parameters.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, various studies have found empirical evidences of indirect pressure as a consequence of the ostracism mechanism [13,[15][16][17][18][19]. It is notable that ostracism is very similar to another mechanism known as social exclusion [20][21][22]. In social exclusion, freeriders are shunned and ignored, with the collective production gain and benefits of the community being excluded from the defectors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Emergence of cooperation in a coupled socio-ecological system through a direct or an indirect social control mechanism

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The successful management of a common pool resource (CPR) by its social agents is key to its sustainability. In order to maintain the ecological resource of such a coupled socio-ecological system, cooperative effort from the whole society is required and this necessitates proper social control mechanism to regulate the social order. In this paper, we explore the effects of two social control mechanisms: ostracism and voluntary enforcement, on agents that actively exploit the CPR within societies of different social network structures (as encapsulated by its average network degree). By means of numerical simulations and analytical approximation, we made inference on the dynamical behavior of the system in terms of its phase diagram. The phase diagram is found to contain a plethora of phases and associated phase transitions as we enumerate them based on a social and an ecological parameter. At a large average network degree, the features of the phases are observed to be similar for the direct voluntary enforcement and indirect ostracism mechanisms. However, these features exhibit a unique difference at low average network degree, where we uncover a new phenomenon of nonequilibrium oscillatory phase attributed to the voluntary enforcement mechanism.

show abstract

“…where k c gives the number of neighboring cooperators of a defector with k neighbors [20]. Note that h, t and g are constant parameters.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emergence of cooperation in a coupled socio-ecological system through a direct or an indirect social control mechanism

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Still, spatial prisoners dilemma with expellers can also be considered as a kind of coevolutionary model between individual strategies and network structures as the neighborhoods of individuals are also coevolved with strategies in our model [22]. Recently, the impact of social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation governed by group interaction has been extensively studied in infinite populations, finite populations and spatial networks, respectively [105][106][107]. In their works, excluders are able to deny the rights of defectors to enjoy the benefits of public goods at some cost.…”

Section: Summary and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with expellers

Wang

Kong

2019

J. Phys. Commun.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Expulsion refers to the widespread behavior of expelling intruders from the owners' territories, which has not been considered in current models on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation so far. In the context of prisoner's dilemma, we present a simple game-theoretical model of expulsion in which punishing cooperators (i.e. expellers) are able to banish defectors from their own neighborhoods. In the mean-field limit, our theoretical analysis of prisoner's dilemma with expellers shows that the increment of either vacant sites ratio or time scale parameter between pairwise interaction process and strategy updating process can slow down evolutionary speed though defection is the only stable fixed point anyway. In more realistic spatial settings, we provide both analytical and numerical results for the limiting case where pairwise interaction dynamics proceeds much faster than strategy updating dynamics. Using the extended pair approximation methods and Monte Carlo simulations, we show that the introduction of expellers not only promotes coevolution of expulsion and cooperation by means of both direct and indirect domain competition but also opens the gate to rich dynamical behaviors even if expulsion is costly. Phase diagrams reveal the occurrence of frozen as well as dynamical stationary states, between which continuous or discontinuous phase transition may happen. For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the coupled interplay between pairwise interaction dynamics and strategy updating dynamics, and show that the validity of main results for the limiting case can be extended to this general case. Interestingly, there exists an optimal value of time scale parameter that results in the maximum fraction of altruistic players, which resembles the coherence resonance phenomenon in dynamical systems. Our results may provide insights into understanding coevolutionary dynamics of expulsive and cooperative behavior in social dilemma situations. the one-short prisoner's dilemma. However, if both players choose defection then their individual income is lower than that obtained for mutual cooperation when maximum overall payoff is shared equally. Meanwhile, we observe that cooperation is ubiquitous in nature as well as human society [6][7][8]. The evolutionary puzzle here arising is how natural selection can lead to cooperation [9].Until now, five fundamental rules, i.e. kin selection [10, 11], direct reciprocity [12], indirect reciprocity [13], network reciprocity [14-16] and group selection [17,18], are reported to be able to enforce the evolution of cooperation in different contexts [19]. Of the five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation, considerable attention from physics community has been paid to network reciprocity [20][21][22]. In evolutionary games on graphs, players occupy the vertices of a graph. The edges determine who interacts and competes with whom. Following the pioneering work of Nowak and May [14], evolutionary prisoner's dilemma has been explored on various spatial networks [23-25] and di...

show abstract

“…In particular, the public goods game has been recognized as a paradigm, which succinctly describes the essential dilemma of cooperation [2,6]. Recent works on the public goods game have proposed effective means to enable the evolution of cooperation, such as punishment [7][8][9][10][11][12][13], reward [14][15][16], exclusion [17][18][19][20], and individual migration [21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

2020

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or defector, while other enthusiastically searches cooperator mates. Albeit both extreme attitudes are observed in human behavior, but their specific impacts on wellbeing remained unexplored. In this work, we propose an orientation-driven migration approach for mobile individuals in combination with the mentioned migration preferences and study their roles in the cooperation level in a two-dimensional public goods game. We find that cooperation can be greatly promoted when individuals are more inclined to escape away from their defective neighbors. On the contrary, cooperation cannot be effectively maintained when individuals are more motivated to approach their cooperative neighbors. In addition, compared with random migration, movement by leaving defectors can promote cooperation more effectively. By means of theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we further find that when individuals only choose to escape away from their defective neighbors, the average distance between cooperators and defectors can be enlarged, hence the natural invasion of defection can be efficiently blocked. Our work, thus, provides further insight on how different migration preferences influence the evolution of cooperation in the unified framework of spatially social games. such mode of migration leads to the outbreak of cooperation. On the other hand, Chen et al proposed riskdriven migration in the collective-risk social dilemma game on a square lattice and found that risk-driven migration dramatically enhances the evolution of public cooperation when individuals move away from unfavorable locations [41].It is worth pointing out that most of previous works consider random migration [28,40], success-driven migration [27], or risk-driven migration [41] separately. They do not consider the orientation-driven migration under which different migration preferences or migration modes are considered in a unified framework. Indeed individuals can adjust their moving orientation according to these preferred modes. By means of migration they can move away from unfavorable environment, pursuit the profitable circumstances, or choose other directions as they wish in realistic situations. However, it is still unclear how such orientation-driven migration influences the evolution of cooperation and which mode of individual migration can promote the evolution of cooperation more effectively.In this work, we thereby propose an orientation-driven migration into a population of mobile individuals playing the public goods game. We assume that individuals can choose the direction of mobility depending on the strategy types of their neighbors on a two-dimensional plane under such orientation-driven migration. Correspondingly, individuals can choose to escape from neighboring defectors or move to neighboring cooperato...

show abstract

Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game

Cited by 102 publications

References 52 publications

Emergence of cooperation in a coupled socio-ecological system through a direct or an indirect social control mechanism

Emergence of cooperation in a coupled socio-ecological system through a direct or an indirect social control mechanism

Evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with expellers

Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About