1994
DOI: 10.1016/0169-5150(94)90041-8
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Agricultural trade negotiations as a strategic game

Abstract: This study views multilateral tradc negotiations as a strategie garne among nations or regions, including taxpayer, consumer, and producer components. Payoffs arc calculated from an interrncdiatc-run international trade rnodel initialized with 1989 data. For the public at large, the Nash equilibrium and socially optimal outcomc is liberalization of trade -unilateral or multilateral. Maintenance of the status quo of market distortions eosting the world billions of dollars each year is rational only if producer … Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Global evidence also points to political decision makers, the agent, as serving farmers rather than the public at large. Makki, Tweeten, and Gleckler (1994) employed game theory to analyze outcomes from freer trade for countries and regions as predicted by an international agricultural trade model. The difference between actual trade and welfare-maximizing outcomes predicted by the strategic trade model for food consumers, producers, taxpayers, and the public at large only made sense if the principal being served by international trade negotiations is commercial farmers, not society.…”
Section: Principal-agent Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Global evidence also points to political decision makers, the agent, as serving farmers rather than the public at large. Makki, Tweeten, and Gleckler (1994) employed game theory to analyze outcomes from freer trade for countries and regions as predicted by an international agricultural trade model. The difference between actual trade and welfare-maximizing outcomes predicted by the strategic trade model for food consumers, producers, taxpayers, and the public at large only made sense if the principal being served by international trade negotiations is commercial farmers, not society.…”
Section: Principal-agent Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That is, wide adoption and use by foreign countries of our dumping policies will cause them to reject our farm products which for sound economic reasons often are exported by us below the full cost of production. The big losers from trade barriers are the countries which practice them (Makki et al, 1994). The US gains from multilateral and unilateral trade liberalization but producers gain most from multilateral liberalization.…”
Section: The Foundation For New Farm Program Directionsmentioning
confidence: 99%