Agency Strategies and Executive Review: The Hidden Politics of Budgeting

LeLoup, Lance T.; Moreland, William B.

doi:10.2307/975675

Cited by 39 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…At least for bureaucrats in general, empirical evidence seems to support this conjecture in many cases: several papers reveal a striving for mostly considerable budget increases by various American agencies (Sharkansky, 1965(Sharkansky, , 1968LeLoup and Moreland, 1978;Lauth, 1986;Thompson, 1987;Ryu et al, 2007;ASAP, 2008). Blais and Dion (1990) expect a bureaucratic self-interest to exist after (inter alia) reviewing the results of Krueger (1988), showing the number of applicants for U.S. federal jobs to increase when public compared to private wages increase, and Sigelman (1986), suggesting an eagerness for higher agency means to prevail among most American senior administrators.…”

Section: Government-oriented Objectivesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets

Lindemann

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: Despite the positive effect electricity grids separated from generation and supply by ownership are expected to have on the level of competition in the non-network activities, several EU member states still adhere to a solely legally unbundled transmission grid. This choice might be induced by regulators focusing on objectives other than the promotion of consumer interests: Terms of use: Documents in EconStor maytheoretically analyzing the decisions an authority takes on both the unbundling regime and the grid charge when it supervises a network monopolist providing a downstream Cournot duopoly with capacity, we find an agency pursuing consumer-oriented goals to always implement Ownership Unbundling. For a regulator acting in the interests of the industry or the government, though, results suggest the authority to be indifferent between Legal and Ownership Unbundling; minor potential drawbacks of a network separated by ownership for the agency or the companies might then tip the scales and cause the regulator to adhere to Legal Unbundling.JEL-classification: D73, L12, L13, L42, L50, L51, L94

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Section: Government-oriented Objectivesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets

Lindemann

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…Many studies have documented administrators' requests for budget increases or attempts to start new programs within an agency (Leloup and Moreland 1978;Lynn 1991;Niskanen 1971Niskanen , 1991Sharkansky 1968;Wildavsky 1964Wildavsky , 1988. In some instances, the size of budget requests varied substantially across agencies.…”

Section: Administrators' Preferences For Expansionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These three works-as well as offerings from Anton (1966), Fenno (1966), Sharkansky (1968), Tullock (1970), Buchanan (1977), Leloup and Moreland (1978), Arnold (1979), Sigelman (1986), and Blais and Dion (1991)-have sought to understand and explain the role of the bureaucrat in the budget process. Perhaps Kiewiet (1991, 144) best captures the current situation when he states, "they [budget-maximizing assumptions] are not strictly true, but they are close enough approximations to what we experience as the real world that no alternative assumptions are as compelling."…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

Establishing a Continuum from Minimizing to Maximizing Bureaucrats: State Agency Head Preferences for Governmental Expansion—A Typology of Administrator Growth Postures, 1964–98

Bowling¹,

Cho²,

Wright³

2004

Public Administration Review

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Scholars have long suspected the blanket description of bureaucrats as "budget maximizers" is simplistic and inaccurate. This article provides empirical grounds for questioning that description and enhances our understanding of bureaucratic fiscal preferences. Bureaucratic preferences for expansion are distributed along a continuum. A typology of agency heads' expansion preferences is developed and related to Downs's typology of bureaucrats. Data from eight surveys of state agency heads (1964-98) enable us to trace administrators' preferences for expansion over four decades. These preferences vary substantially in any single survey year and reflect trends across these years. Notably, a substantial proportion of agency heads opted for no expansion in their own agency's programs and expenditures or in the state's overall budget. This typology challenges conventional conceptions of bureaucrats' maximizing preferences, advances alternative interpretations about budget minimizing, and fills an important gap in budget and bureaucracy theory.In few arenas of public administration are the conflicts, contentions, and competition more intense, subtle, and complex than in the arena of budgeting. Kettl (2003, 171) asserts that "budgeting is the nerve center of the political universe-and it can often seem that this center is in chaos." For the better part of the last four decades, budgets, budgeting, and budget theory have been pivot points in this chaos, around which reform, responsibility, accountability, performance, evaluations, and control have revolved.In this article, we describe the variety, variations, and distributions of budgetary preferences. We contend that a better understanding of budgeting behavior is possible if we can better grasp the preferences (goals) that promote actions. Budgetary preferences are relevant and significant variables in the budget process. By describing the diverse Cynthia J. Bowling is an assistant professor of political science at Auburn University. Her research focuses on public administrators, bureaucracy, and policy within the broader state and local government context. She is currently involved in research to identify and explain patterns of female representation in state agency head positions over the last four decades.

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“…2 el criterio del 10% proviene del trabajo de Le Loup y Moreland (1978), que es el más cercano a una definición sólida para medir el incrementalismo y el más utilizado para su medición (Anderson y Harbridge 2010: p. 5). Utilizar este criterio por tanto permite una mayor comparabilidad de los resultados de la investigación en México con los resultados de otras investigaciones en otros países.…”

Section: Incrementalismo Presupuestal Y Política Públicaunclassified

Incrementalismo presupuestal en México: Un análisis de los programas presupuestarios del PEF 2010-2015

Téllez

2016

GAPP

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Agency Strategies and Executive Review: The Hidden Politics of Budgeting

Cited by 39 publications

References 3 publications

Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets

Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets

Establishing a Continuum from Minimizing to Maximizing Bureaucrats: State Agency Head Preferences for Governmental Expansion—A Typology of Administrator Growth Postures, 1964–98

Incrementalismo presupuestal en México: Un análisis de los programas presupuestarios del PEF 2010-2015

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