Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: Independent regulatory authorities are a basic prerequisite for a successful liberalization process. However, contrary to what is expected, both graphical analyses and OLS regressions for a small sample of electricity and gas regulators operating in 16 European countries reveal a negative relationship between the authorities' formal autonomy from politicians and the scope of market reforms. These findings might suffer from endogeneity, though, so we draw on political scientists' explanations for diverging independence levels to construct appropriate instruments. The 2SLS-IV results then confirm conventional wisdom: the higher the degree of regulatory autonomy, the higher the level of liberalization. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-classification: L50, L94, L95, L98

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The degree of liberalization in OECD electricity markets varies considerably across countries. Commonly, these differences are explained by diverging economic developments, varying political systems and preferences and industrial interference. The empirical estimations reported in this paper, however, suggest another reason: The more a step towards full competition in the electricity sector reduces the tax revenues generated by this industry, the less likely is its implementation. We conjecture that this relationship is especially caused by the persistent financial dependency of regulatory decision-makers on governments, which results in authorities that shrink from reforms which reduce the executive's and hence their own financial ressources.In this case, a clear delineation of a regulator's budgetary interests from its regulatory goals is vital to achieve the latter. JEL-classification: L50, L94, L95, L98

The degree of separation between transmission networks and the remaining stages of the electricity value chain varies considerably within the European Union. Suggesting a possible explanation for this diversity by assuming a regulator that acts as in Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy, we show that in a multi-stage game the actual degree of unbundling is only determined by the weight attached to the objectives pursued by this authority. Hence, national regulators might exploit their discretionary powers to their own advantage. This might, in turn, decisively shape the deregulation process in European electricity markets and impede the development of a homogeneous regulatory environment across the EU.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: Despite the positive effect electricity grids separated from generation and supply by ownership are expected to have on the level of competition in the non-network activities, several EU member states still adhere to a solely legally unbundled transmission grid. This choice might be induced by regulators focusing on objectives other than the promotion of consumer interests: Terms of use: Documents in EconStor maytheoretically analyzing the decisions an authority takes on both the unbundling regime and the grid charge when it supervises a network monopolist providing a downstream Cournot duopoly with capacity, we find an agency pursuing consumer-oriented goals to always implement Ownership Unbundling. For a regulator acting in the interests of the industry or the government, though, results suggest the authority to be indifferent between Legal and Ownership Unbundling; minor potential drawbacks of a network separated by ownership for the agency or the companies might then tip the scales and cause the regulator to adhere to Legal Unbundling.JEL-classification: D73, L12, L13, L42, L50, L51, L94