Against Parthood

Sider, Theodore

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682904.003.0006

Cited by 177 publications

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“…Appeals to simplicity are increasingly explicit,e.g. in arguments for mereological nihilism (Sider 2013;Brenner 2015), presentism (Tallant 2013), external world realism (Vogel 1990;Huemer 2016) and necessitism (Williamson 2013). See also Biggs (2011) and Biggs andWilson (2016, 2017).…”

Section: Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics

Bradley

2017

Synthese

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Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap's 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' (1950a). But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in 'Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy ' (1928). The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root of his argument is the claim that metaphysical statements cannot be justified; the point is epistemic, not semantic. I will argue that this remains a powerful challenge to metaphysics that has yet to be adequately answered.

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Section: Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics

Bradley

2017

Synthese

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“…to focus on purely philosophical matters such as compositional nihilism (there are no composite objects; Rosen and Dorr 2002 , Sider ms.), artifact nihilism (there are no artifacts; van Inwagen 1990, Merricks 2001, moral error theory (there are no positive, fi rst-order, substantive moral truths; Mackie 1977 ), mathematical error theory (there are no positive, fi rst-order, substantive mathematical truths; Field 1980, Field 1989, Balaguer 1998, semantic nihilism (no assertions made with or beliefs expressed with vague terms are true; Sider and Braun 2007 ), and radical skepticism (there is virtually no knowledge). 3 The line between the philosophical theses with little or no scientifi c backing and those with signifi cant scientifi c backing is usually considered to be generously fuzzy, but there are obvious examples on either side of the line.…”

Section: B Ryan F Rancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophical Renegades

Frances¹

2013

The Epistemology of Disagreement

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“…This idea is the target of a great deal of metaphysical scrutiny and criticism (Quine 1950(Quine , 1960Chisholm 1973;Unger 1979;Wiggins 1980Wiggins , 2001Lewis 1986;Van Inwagen 1990;Sider 2001Sider , 2013. My aim here is to elaborate a specific version of the commonsense commitment and to consider its merits in connection with an important line of objection concerning the relation between material objects and their parts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…5 Nihilists deny the existence of Tibbles and every other putative composite macroscopic thing, including of course Tib (Unger 1979;Dorr and Rosen 2002;Sider 2013). Microscopic metaphysical simples never compose.…”

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confidence: 99%

Material Objects and Their Parts

Brewer

2017

Metaphysica

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AbstractCommonsense appears committed to enduring macroscopic material objects that exclude each other from their precise location at all times. I elaborate a specific version of the commonsense commitment and consider its merits in connection with an important line of objection concerning the relation between material objects and their parts. The central thesis is that amongst persisting macroscopic material objects there are Natural Continuants, NCs, whose unity at a time and over time is entirely independent of our concepts, which occupy their precise spatial location Exclusively at all times, and which ground Artificial Continuants, ACs, by partition, collection, and approximation. I call the position the Natural Continuants View (NCV). Section “The Natural Continuants View” offers a provisional characterization. Section “Spatial Partition” considers a familiar puzzle concerning the idea that material objects may survive the loss of a part in order to provide intuitive motivation for (NCV) and to elaborate its commitments concerning (spatial) parts. The result is an account of the way in which NCs ground ACs by spatial partition. Section “Collection and Approximation” turns to a consideration of collections and assemblages of NCs. Section “Conclusion” concludes.

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Against Parthood

Cited by 177 publications

References 0 publications

Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics

Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics

Philosophical Renegades

Material Objects and Their Parts

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