Against Organizational Functions

Abstract

Over the last 20 years, several philosophers developed a new approach to biological functions, the organizational (or systems-theoretic) approach. This is not a single theory but a family of theories based on the idea that a trait token can acquire a function by virtue of the way it contributes to a complex, organized, system, and thereby to its own continued persistence, as a token. I argue that the organizational approach faces a serious liberality objection. I examine three different ways organizational theorists have tried to avoid that objection and show how they fail.

Do Functions Explain? Hegel and the Organizational View

“…Despite making inroads into the function debate, the organisational view has been criticised for being too liberal (Garson 2017) and for underdetermining function ascriptions (Cusimano & Sterner 2019). In Justin Garson's (2017Garson's ( : 1094 assessment, the organisational view boils down to a single requirement: X is a function if X contributes to a complex, organised system.…”

“…Despite making inroads into the function debate, the organisational view has been criticised for being too liberal (Garson 2017) and for underdetermining function ascriptions (Cusimano & Sterner 2019). In Justin Garson's (2017Garson's ( : 1094 assessment, the organisational view boils down to a single requirement: X is a function if X contributes to a complex, organised system. On this requirement, he claims, the view fails to respond to Christopher Boorse's (1976) liberality objection, which states that a theory of function is inadequate if it attributes functionality to traits that have a negative effect on the survival of a system.…”

“…On this requirement, he claims, the view fails to respond to Christopher Boorse's (1976) liberality objection, which states that a theory of function is inadequate if it attributes functionality to traits that have a negative effect on the survival of a system. Garson (2017Garson ( : 1098 considers the example of panic disorder, which meets the complexity requirement of organised systems. In a panic disorder, false beliefs -such as the belief that a certain posture can cause heart attacks -cause avoidance behaviours, which cause more attacks.…”

“…Its proponents can only avoid the liberality objection, Garson (2017Garson ( : 1099 contends, by introducing a normative dimension to inquiry, such that for a trait to have a function 'it must benefit the system.' Yet to introduce a normative dimension would take analysis 'far beyond the narrow confines of a naturalistic theory of function', for what 'makes a view naturalistic', Garson (2017Garson ( : 1099 insists, 'is precisely its appeal to value-neutral predicates. '…”

Does the solar system compute the laws of motion?

“…Piccinini's mechanistic account depends on the assumption that an adequate naturalistic theory of objectively existing teleological functions can be developed, since it is only if it is paired with such a theory that it can yield a verdict as to which physical systems compute and which don't. This assumption is, to put it mildly, a heroic one, given the longstanding, formidable difficulty of developing such a theory (Casini, 2017;Cummins, 2002;Davies, 2000;Dennett, 1978;Garson, 2017;Millikan, 1989;Peters, 2014;Searle, 1995, p. 15;Tolly, forthcoming). 5 Copeland's AXA, in contrast, makes no such bold assumptions.…”