Do Functions Explain? Hegel and the Organizational View

Cooper, Andrew

doi:10.1017/hgl.2020.14

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(46 reference statements)

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“…It should be noted that these authors differ both in what they identify as the main challenge that Hegel responds to and in their reconstructions of Hegel's response. In this paper, I do not attempt to settle this disagreement, though.3 SeeCooper (2020) andMaraguat (2020).4 SeeRand (2013),Alznauer (2016),Mills (2020).5 As will become clear shortly, I take Hegel to make a philosophically significant distinction between the logical concept of life and the concept of the natural organism. The logical concept of life has systematic significance for Hegel beyond its bearing on the concept of the natural organism.…”

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confidence: 99%

Logical and natural life in Hegel

Kabeshkin

2021

European J of Philosophy

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In this article, I discuss the specific ways in which Hegel's account of life and organisms advances upon Kant's account of natural purposes in the third Critique. First of all, I argue that it is essential for Hegel's account that it contains two levels. The first level is that of logical life, the discussion of which does not depend on any empirical knowledge of natural organisms. I provide my reconstruction of this logical account of life that answers to the objection made by a number of Hegel scholars to the effect that Hegel does in fact rely on empirical knowledge at this place in the logic.The second level is that of natural organisms themselves. I argue that it is with the help of this separation of the logical and natural levels, as well as his doctrine of the impotence of nature, that Hegel, unlike Kant, (a) is able to claim that not everything in natural organisms is purposive, and (b) provide a philosophical, and not merely empirical, account of the distinction between plants and animals. In both of these respects, Hegel's position can be seen as a welcome advance over Kant.

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confidence: 99%

Logical and natural life in Hegel

Kabeshkin

2021

European J of Philosophy

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“… 7 See Cooper 2020 on problems with Kant's inflationary view of teleology that relies on an artifact analogy and how Hegel's position is better suited to understand internal purposiveness as a natural cause.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Is a Logical Concept of Life? Reply to Critics

Ng¹

2021

Hegel Bulletin

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I am very grateful to Karen Koch and Sebastian Rand for their generous and thoughtful engagement with some of the core arguments of my book. Whereas Koch raises a number of questions concerning the purposiveness theme and Hegel's relation to Kant, Rand's questions revolve around the interpretation of Hegel's Science of Logic, asking after the status of the a priori, singularity, and death in relation to the logical concept of life. Their critical questions provide an opportunity for me to both clarify and defend one of the central claims of my book, namely, that there is a distinctly logical concept of life at work in Hegel's philosophy that is key for understanding his philosophical method. In the book, I argue that this concept, operative in Hegel's writings from the Differenzschrift through the Phenomenology to his Science of Logic, is primarily inherited from Kant, specifically from problems surrounding the concept of inner purposiveness developed in the Critique of Judgement. I will begin by replying to Koch, followed by a response to Rand.

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“…De Caro & Macarthur (2010). 2 My attempt will move in the same direction as Cooper (2020) and Maraguat (2020). My focus, however, will be more on the kind of normativity involved in the notion of organisation, which I claim is foundational for Hegel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘Is’ and the ‘Ought’ of the Animal Organism: Hegel’s Account of Biological Normativity

Corti

2022

HPLS

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This paper investigates Hegel’s account of the animal organism as it is presented in the Philosophy of Nature, with a special focus on its normative implications. I argue that the notion of “organisation” is fundamental to Hegel’s theory of animal normativity. The paper starts by showing how a Hegelian approach takes up the scientific image of organism and assigns a basic explanatory role to the notion of “organisation” in its understanding living beings. Moving from this premise, the paper turns to the group of accounts in contemporary theoretical biology known as “organisational accounts” (OA), which offer a widely debated strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity in organisms. As recent scholarship recognizes, these accounts explicitly rely on insights from Kant and Post-Kantianism. I make the historical and conceptual argument that Hegel’s view of the organism shares several basic commitments with OAs, especially regarding the notion of “organisational closure”. I assess the account of normativity that such accounts advance and its implications for how we approach Hegel. Finally, I argue that the notion of “organisation” is more fundamental to Hegel’s theory of animal normativity than the Aristotelian notion of “Gattung” or “species”, which by contrast appears derivative – at least in the Philosophy of Nature and the Lectures – and does not play the central role in his account maintained by some scholars.

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Do Functions Explain? Hegel and the Organizational View

Cited by 10 publications

References 28 publications

Logical and natural life in Hegel

Logical and natural life in Hegel

What Is a Logical Concept of Life? Reply to Critics

The ‘Is’ and the ‘Ought’ of the Animal Organism: Hegel’s Account of Biological Normativity

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