Against Grounding Necessitarianism

Skiles, Alexander

doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9669-y

Cited by 262 publications

(125 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Indeed, in the literature one finds counterexamples to claim that Grounding carries modal entailment (see, e.g., Leuenberger 2014;Schnieder 2006;Skiles 2015). Here, I am not interested in adjudicating this debate which is internal to the Grounding literature.…”

Section: Grounding and Necessitationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

Elpidorou

2017

Topoi

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naturalism, and dualism are reconsidered. The special issue is neither the first nor the last word on the topic of the character physicalism. Nonetheless, it offers both an updated appraisal of our current understanding of physicalism and concrete proposals for how to move forward. Physicalism: Ontology and MetaphysicsAt the heart of physicalism lies an ontological (or if you prefer, ontic) thesis.1 To espouse physicalism is to make certain commitments about what types of things (objects, properties, events, states of affairs) exist in our world (Quine 1948; cf. Hellman and Thompson 1977, p. 310).2 IfNot many issues in philosophy can be said to match, let alone rival, physicalism's importance, persistent influence, and divisiveness. To a first approximation, physicalism holds that everything that exists in our world is physical. An acceptance of physicalism commits thus one to a monistic worldview. Despite how variegated existing entities or properties might appear to be, everything that exists in our world is, according to physicalism, the same: namely, physical. Indeed, it is widely thought that physicalism demands not only that the non-physical (the chemical, the biological, the economic, the social, the mental, etc.) metaphysically depends on the physical but also that the non-physical is nothing over and above the physical. But what type of metaphysical dependence vindicates physicalism?The aim of this editorial introduction is twofold. First, Sects. 1-8 offer a critical introduction to the metaphysical character of physicalism. In those sections, I present and evaluate different ways in which proponents of physicalism have made explicit the metaphysical dependence that is said to hold between the non-physical and the physical. Some of these accounts are found to be problematic; others are shown to be somewhat more promising. In the end, some important lessons are drawn and different options for physicalists are presented. Second, in Sect. 9, the six papers that comprise the special issue are introduced and summarized. Each contribution to the special is, in different ways, concerned with explicating the character of physicalism. New ways of formulating physicalism are assessed; old ways are defended; and the distinctions between physicalism, Both terms are acceptable and the choice between them is ultimately idiosyncratic. "Physicalism" has the benefit of rendering the metaphysical view under discussion both more general (the extension of "physical," I presume, is larger than that of "material") and closer to present-day physics. "Materialism" has the benefit of showing how the metaphysical view under discussion has a historical lineage and as such relates to the views of Hobbes, Lucretius, and Democritus. 2 It is often stated that physicalism is both a contingent thesis and one that has strong modal commitments (Lewis 1983;Jackson 1998; Stoljar 2015). Its contingency is manifested in the claim that physicalism is a thesis about our world and even if it is true, it did not have to be so. Furthermore, the ...

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Section: Grounding and Necessitationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

Elpidorou

2017

Topoi

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“…8 One further feature that is often ascribed to grounding but which I will not assume is that grounding is necessitating in the sense that if y is fully grounded in x, then necessarily: if x exists, then y exists. While grounding is generally taken to be necessitating, this has been questioned by Skiles (2015). 9 For a challenge to irreflexivity, see Jenkins (2011).…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding and ontological dependence

Rydéhn

2018

Synthese

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Recent metaphysics has seen a surge of interest in grounding-a relation of non-causal determination underlying a distinctive kind of explanation common in philosophy. In this article, I investigate the connection between grounding and another phenomenon of great interest to metaphysics: ontological dependence. There are interesting parallels between the two phenomena: for example, both are commonly invoked through the use of "dependence" terminology, and there is a great deal of overlap in the motivations typically appealed to when introducing them. I approach the question of the relationship between grounding and ontological dependence through an investigation of their modal connections (or lack thereof). I argue, firstly, that on the common assumption that grounding is factive, it can be shown that no known variety of rigid ontological dependence is either necessary or sufficient for grounding. I also offer some suggestions in support of the claim that this generalizes to every possible form of rigid ontological dependence. I then broaden the discussion by considering a non-factive conception of grounding, as well as by looking at forms of generic (rather than rigid) ontological dependence. I argue that there is at least one form of rigid ontological dependence that is sufficient for non-factive grounding, and that a form of generic dependence may be necessary (but not sufficient) both for factive and non-factive grounding. However, justifying even these fairly weak modal connections between grounding and ontological dependence turns out to require some quite specific and substantive assumptions about the two phenomena that have only rarely been discussed.

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“…Let Γ be the set of the actual first‐order facts. Let grounding necessitarianism be the claim that grounding entails, but is not reducible to, necessitation, and let grounding contingentism be the claim that there are at least some cases where grounding does not entail necessitation (as Alexander Skiles , p. 718 observes, there seem to be no contingentists who accept the stronger claim that there are no cases where grounding entails necessitation). Thus, as far as the grounder is concerned, we have two pairs of distinctions: that between monism and pluralism, on the one hand, and that between necessitarianism and contingentism, on the other.…”

Section: The Objection From Accidental Generalizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Among those who accept necessitarianism are: Audi (), Cameron (forthcoming), Dasgupta (), deRosset (), Rosen (), Trogdon (), and Wilsch (2015). In contrast, Leuenberger (2013), Skiles (), and Schaffer () are notable for being among the comparatively few grounders who accept contingentism. As for pluralism, it is easier to list those grounders who reject it (and thereby accept monism), rather than the vast majority who accept it: Schaffer (, ) is the most prominent example of the former.…”

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confidence: 99%

Grounding and the Objection from Accidental Generalizations

McDaniel

2017

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Monistic grounding says that there is one fundamental ground, while pluralistic grounding says that there are many such grounds. Grounding necessitarianism says that grounding entails, but is not reducible to, necessitation, while grounding contingentism says that there are at least some cases where grounding does not entail necessitation. Pluralistic grounding necessitarianism is a very popular position, but accidental generalizations, such as ‘all solid gold spheres are less than one mile in diameter’, pose well‐known problems for this view: the many fundamental grounds of such generalizations do not necessitate them. Though there is a straightforward response to this objection, I argue that it fails. Thus the objection from accidental generalizations stands, and proponents of pluralistic grounding necessitarianism face the following dilemma: either give up pluralistic grounding, or give up necessitarianism.

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Against Grounding Necessitarianism

Cited by 262 publications

References 47 publications

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

Grounding and ontological dependence

Grounding and the Objection from Accidental Generalizations

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