This is the second part of an overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. Here, the notion of fundamentality is looked at from the viewpoint of the philosophical analysis of physics and physical theories. The questions are considered (1) whether physics can be regarded as fundamental with respect to other sciences, and in what sense; (2) what the label 'fundamental physics' should exactly be taken to mean; (3) on what grounds a particular physical theory should be considered fundamental; (4) what should be regarded as fundamental according to particular theories of physics; and (5) what indications come from contemporary physics concerning the fundamental structure of reality. 1 | INTRODUCTION Physics is often portrayed as the science that explores the fundamental constituents of reality and the laws that govern them. In view of this-at least if one conceives of metaphysics in a naturalistic sense and consequently aims to make one's philosophical analysis as scientifically aware as possible-it looks like philosophers dealing with fundamentality-related issues should pay close attention to what physicists have to say. 1 While this is true, however, it is not obvious to what extent, and in what precise sense, one should regard physics as a fundamental science. Indeed, an assessment of the (putative) fundamentality of physics seems both independent of and prior to the evaluation of the import of physical theories when it comes to metaphysical fundamentality. 2 Moreover, there are several aspects to be considered, and a number of elements that should be disentangled and kept separated. The present paper aims to provide a synopsis of all these aspects of fundamentality in the philosophy of physics. In Section 2 we introduce the idea that physics is the fundamental science, a view which is