Fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. Part II: The philosophy of physics

Abstract

This is the second part of an overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. Here, the notion of fundamentality is looked at from the viewpoint of the philosophical analysis of physics and physical theories. The questions are considered (1) whether physics can be regarded as fundamental with respect to other sciences, and in what sense; (2) what the label 'fundamental physics' should exactly be taken to mean; (3) on what grounds a particular physical theory should be considered fundamental; (4) what should be regarded as fundamental according to particular theories of physics; and (5) what indications come from contemporary physics concerning the fundamental structure of reality. 1 | INTRODUCTION Physics is often portrayed as the science that explores the fundamental constituents of reality and the laws that govern them. In view of this-at least if one conceives of metaphysics in a naturalistic sense and consequently aims to make one's philosophical analysis as scientifically aware as possible-it looks like philosophers dealing with fundamentality-related issues should pay close attention to what physicists have to say. 1 While this is true, however, it is not obvious to what extent, and in what precise sense, one should regard physics as a fundamental science. Indeed, an assessment of the (putative) fundamentality of physics seems both independent of and prior to the evaluation of the import of physical theories when it comes to metaphysical fundamentality. 2 Moreover, there are several aspects to be considered, and a number of elements that should be disentangled and kept separated. The present paper aims to provide a synopsis of all these aspects of fundamentality in the philosophy of physics. In Section 2 we introduce the idea that physics is the fundamental science, a view which is

Hempel’s Dilemma: Not Only for Physicalism*

“…That some x is metaphysically fundamental means, roughly, that x is a privileged entity, or set of entities, playing a special role in determining the structure of reality. (Morganti 2020) A Hempelian Dilemma can also arise with respect to non-fundamental theories. For example, if the mental is understood in terms of the physiology of the brain:…”

“…To the extent that Hempel's Dilemma applies to non-fundamental theories, it is applicable in case there is no fundamental theory or realm at all (see Morganti 2020).…”

Spacetime Emergence: Collapsing the Distinction Between Content and Context?

“…These are semiclassical states; i.e., states in which the quantum fluctuations are minimal and the gravitational field behaves almost classically.5 The analogy comes fromAshtekar, Rovelli, and Smolin (1992).6 The following discussion is based onCrowther (2018a), although the definition of relative fundamentality differs here in that I include two conditions, while Crowther (2018a) requires only one.7 While QG must be more fundamental than GR, QG need not be a fundamental theory; i.e., it is not necessary to include the criterion of (absolute) fundamentality in the definition of QG(Crowther & Linnemann, 2019). For other ideas of fundamentality in physics and metaphysics, seeMorganti (2020aMorganti ( , 2020b.…”