Affirmative Action Can Increase Effort

Fain, James R.

doi:10.1007/s12122-009-9062-9

Cited by 31 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Section 6 concludes. 7 For instance, see Fu (2007) and Fain (2009). 8 In fact, retaking being excessive in our model is analogous to the result of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) on excessive entry with homogeneous …rms and monopolistic competition.…”

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confidence: 58%

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Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More?

2016

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Placement, both in university and in the civil service, according to performance in competitive exams is the norm in much of the world. Repeat taking of such exams is common despite the private and social costs it imposes. We develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey's university placement exam. We find that limiting retaking, though individually harmful given the equilibrium, actually increases expected welfare across the board. This result comes from a general equilibrium effect: retakers crowd the market and impose negative spillovers on others by raising acceptance cutoffs.Abstract Placement, both in university and in the civil service, according to performance in competitive exams is the norm in much of the world. Repeat taking of such exams is common despite the private and social costs it imposes. We develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey's university placement exam.We …nd that limiting retaking, though individually harmful given the equilibrium, actually increases expected welfare across the board. This result comes from a general equilibrium e¤ect: retakers crowd the market and impose negative spillovers on others by raising acceptance cuto¤s.

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confidence: 58%

“…Much of it asks how to elicit more e¤ort from agents as e¤ort is what the principal cares about. 7 Our paper models the contest as an anonymous game where e¤ort is not per se desirable and students take cuto¤s to be admitted as given. This is analogous to monopolistic competition where …rms take the price index as given.…”

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confidence: 99%

Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More?

2016

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“…Fig. 1 graphs the expected test scores of the candidates from privileged and deprived socioeconomic backgrounds 14 Che and Gale (2003) and Fain (2009) have results with a similar flavor in the labor market, where the firm handicaps the more efficient worker. In these papers the contest designer's objective is to maximize the total as a function of the preferential treatment parameter for all…”

Section: The Equilibrium Admissions Policymentioning

confidence: 92%

Student incentives and preferential treatment in college admissions

Pastine

2012

Economics of Education Review

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a b s t r a c tWe consider a framework in which the optimal admissions policy of a purely academicquality oriented college implements preferential treatment in favor of the student from the deprived socioeconomic background which maximizes the competition between candidates. We find that the exact form of the preferential treatment admissions policy matters for student incentives and hence for student-body diversity in equilibrium. Preferential treatment policy in college admissions often takes, or is perceived to take, an additive form where the score of the applicant from the deprived background is augmented by a fixed number of points. Such a preferential treatment policy fails to incentivize students from the deprived background. Despite the affirmative action, the level of preferential treatment that achieves academic excellence leaves student-body diversity unchanged compared with a background-blind admissions policy and leads to a higher intergroup score gap.

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“…Various models in the contests literature also attempt to address the first two questions as well. This includes papers by Fain (2009) and Fu (2006) (see also Fu (2004)), which are two-player all-pay contests under complete information, so heterogeneity among competitors is commonly observable. In both models, an interaction between one advantaged player and one disadvantaged player competing for a single prize is studied: both authors find that an admission-preferencelike AA rule benefitting the disadvantaged player increases effort exerted by both players.…”

Section: Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Minority college applicants in the United States effectively benefit from a 9% inflation of their SAT scores, as well as a small fixed bonus of approximately 34 SAT points. I also estimate distributions over student heterogeneity This work is dedicated in loving memory to my grandfather, I. Reed Payne (1930-2009Ph.D., Clinical Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, 1963). Grandpa was the reason I started talking about getting a doctorate when I was eight.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Student effort, race gaps, and affirmative action in college admissions

Hickman¹

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Affirmative Action Can Increase Effort

Abstract: Affirmative action, Tournaments,

Cited by 31 publications

References 8 publications

Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More?

Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More?

Student incentives and preferential treatment in college admissions

Student effort, race gaps, and affirmative action in college admissions

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