This paper presents a model which captures the three main arguments for and against campaign spending limits. Campaign spending limits are purported to restrict the incumbent's ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. In contrast to conventional wisdom, a ceiling increases the incumbent's probability of victory regardless of the candidates' relative fundraising abilities as long as the challenger is not more effective in campaign spending. If the challenger is more effective in campaign spending, ceilings have a non-monotonic effect when the incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage; A moderate ceiling decreases the incumbent's probability of victory but further restricting the limit favors the incumbent. Irrespective of incumbency status, the marginal benefit to quality decreases with a more restrictive cap. In an open-seat contest, a more restrictive limit improves the electoral prospects of the superior quality candidate. Stricter ceilings may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected spending.
We study the effects of discounting in a standard endogenous price leadership model. We show that there will be occasional changes in the identity of the leader with any cost of delay or discounting, however small. By analyzing the incentives that induce a firm to take up the leader position, we derive positive predictions about which firm will lead most price changes. Firms with shorter reaction times will be more likely to become the price leader, as will firms with lower cost of delay if the firms' reaction times are similar. D
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that advertising can have an important function in markets with consumption externalities apart from its persuasive and informative roles. We show that advertising may function as a device to coordinate consumer expectations of the purchasing decisions of other consumers in markets with consumption externalities. The implications of advertising as a coordinating device are examined in the pricing and advertising decisions of firms interacting strategically. Although, at times, the one-period advertising expense can exceed the one-period monopoly profit, in equilibrium, consumers will pay a premium for the more heavily advertised brand.
We investigate the pricing of 'Brady' bonds that are issued by the governments of five developing countries as part of debt and debt service reduction agreements. We first present a measure of credit quality that takes account of the individual features of each bond and is comparable across bonds, across issuers, and over time. We then examine the evolution of the credit quality of each debt instrument from 1990 until the beginning of 2000. Next, we present evidence of a profitable trading strategy that exploits the information contained in this measure of credit quality.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.