Affect: representationalists’ headache

Aydede, Murat; Fulkerson, Matthew

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0206-7

Cited by 26 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…14 I've criticized perceptual/representational views of pain extensively in the literature. I refer the reader to Aydede (2006Aydede ( , 2009Aydede ( , 2017aAydede ( , 2019 and Aydede & Fulkerson (2014). However, as we'll see later, the framework of my own proposal below is similar to all the representationalisms in (5) in terms of its naturalistic (syntactic) implementation that is open to representationalists themselves to adopt.…”

Section: Optionsmentioning

confidence: 92%

What Is a Pain in a Body Part?

Aydede

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

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The International Association for the Study of Pain’s (IASP) definition of “pain” defines it as a subjective experience. The Note accompanying the definition emphasizes that, as such, pains are not to be identified with objective conditions of body parts (such as actual or potential tissue damage). Nevertheless, it goes on to state that a pain “is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional experience.” This generates a puzzle that philosophers have been well familiar with: how to understand our utterances and judgments attributing pain to body parts. (The puzzle is, of course, general extending to all sensations routinely located in body parts.) This work tackles this puzzle. I go over various options specifying the truth-conditions for pain-attributing judgments and, at the end, make my own recommendation which is an adverbialist, qualia-friendly proposal with completely naturalistic credentials that is also compatible with forms of weak intentionalism. The results are generalizable to other bodily sensations and can be used to illustrate, quite generally, the viability of a qualia-friendly adverbialist (but naturalist and weakly intentionalist) account of perception.

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Section: Optionsmentioning

confidence: 92%

What Is a Pain in a Body Part?

Aydede

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…However, even if suitable intentional contents can be found for all the types of experience listed above, that their phenomenal character is exhausted by such contents, as required by [2], is even more controversial. For one thing, there are some aspects of algedonic and emotional experience that do not seem to fit smoothly that sort of reductive representationalist account, for example their affective or evaluative component (Aydede and Fulkerson 2014). Moods especially seem to escape a representationalist reduction.…”

Section: Defending (P2)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Introspection Without Judgment

Giustina

2019

Erkenn

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“…Those of us attracted by representational theories of phenomenal consciousness are thus provided with yet further reason for rejecting a hedonic account of valence. However, some have sought to reverse the direction of this argument, appealing to the felt properties of affective states to mount a direct challenge to representational theories of consciousness, thereby providing an indirect argument in support of a hedonic account (Aydede & Fulkerson, ; Kind, ). Our final task is to evaluate the strength of this argument.…”

Section: Valence and Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Valence and Value

Carruthers

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Valence is a central component of all affective states, including pains, pleasures, emotions, moods, and feelings of desire or repulsion. 1 This paper has two main goals. One is to suggest that enough is now known about the causes, consequences, and properties of valence to indicate that it forms a unitary natural-psychological kind, one that seemingly plays a fundamental role in motivating all kinds of intentional action. If this turns out to be true, then the correct characterization of the nature of valence becomes an urgent philosophical issue. There appear to be just two accounts that have the required generality. According to one, valence is a nonconceptual representation of value. According to the other, valence is an intrinsic qualitative property of experience. (Both views maintain that valence is directly motivating.) The second goal of the paper is to contrast and evaluate these two views of the nature of valence, drawing on the relevant empirical findings. Overall, I suggest that the representational account is more plausible.

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Affect: representationalists’ headache

Cited by 26 publications

References 27 publications

What Is a Pain in a Body Part?

What Is a Pain in a Body Part?

Introspection Without Judgment

Valence and Value

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