Affect and cognitive control: Insights from research on effort mobilization

Abstract

We present theory and research on effort mobilization that is relevant for understanding the role of affect in cognitive control. We posit that cognitive control and effort are closely related and introduce motivational intensity theory and supporting empirical evidence mainly based on cardiovascular measures of effort. Most important, we discuss the role of affect in the context of effort mobilization and cognitive control from different perspectives. We first present theories predicting affective influences on effort, namely the mood-behavior-model and the implicit-affect-primes-effort model, and supporting empirical evidence. Second, we discuss further implications of the resource conservation principle highlighting the aversive aspect of effort and review evidence for the impact of value and its affective component on effort and cognitive control. Finally, we present a recent integration of the neural mechanisms underlying both effort and cognitive control. We conclude that affective processes are necessary and instrumental for both effort mobilization and cognitive control.

An integrative effort : Bridging motivational intensity theory and recent neurocomputational and neuronal models of effort and control allocation

“…Later on, researchers testing the predictions of MIT focused on the concept of effort (e.g., Gendolla et al, 2012;Wright, 1996), defined as the mobilization of resources to carry out instrumental behavior (Gendolla & Wright, 2009). This definition applies to both physical and cognitive effort, and refers to resources that can be biochemical (e.g., adenosine triphosphate-ATP), psychological (e.g., attention), or physical (e.g., time) in nature (see Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2019). It is assumed that, to achieve their goals, people exert effort by engaging resources and MIT predicts how much resources people mobilize at a particular moment in time.…”

A computational perspective on the roles of affect in cognitive control

“…However, 479 once the task difficulty is high enough so that success on the task is no longer expected, an agent 480 may choose to disengage from the task. Support for this prediction comes from physiological 481 studies which use the responses of the cardiovascular system as a measure of effort mobilization 482 (Wright, 1996;Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2019). In this way there is a convergence of motivation 483 theory and physiological studies on one side, and the neurocomputational accounts of effort Divergent predictions of these accounts can be tested with a combination of behavioral 491 measures that index task selection and performance; peripheral physiological measures that index 492 arousal, affect, attention, and effort output (e.g., pupil dilation, corrugator muscle contraction, 493 cardiovascular activity); and neural measures that index the processing of incentives, task 2017; van der Wel, P., & van Steenbergen, 2018).…”

The impact of pain on subsequent effort and cognitive performance

“…This measure represents a more direct, and unbiased, estimate of effort mobilization than subjective reports, which are confounded by factors like individual beliefs, social-desirability biases, protection mechanisms for self-esteem, etc. (Silvestrini and Gendolla, 2019). Regarding cardiovascular parameters, pre-ejection period (PEP), the time interval between left ventricular excitation and the opening of the aortic valve (Berntson et al, 2004), is the most sensitive non-invasive parameter to assess sympathetic activity because it is mainly determined by heart contractility, which is primarily driven by sympathetic impact on the myocardium.…”

“…Additional effort may preserve performance after exertion of cognitive, but performance should be lower when people disengage, as the task is considered to be too demanding or the required effort not deemed to be justified. However, it is of note that the relationship between effort and performance is not completely straightforward (see Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2019).…”