Advertising Content

Anderson, Simon P.; Renault, Régis

doi:10.1257/000282806776157632

Cited by 239 publications

(158 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…In contrast, in search models, a consumer cannot buy the good without gathering information. In such a search model, Anderson and Renault (2006) show that an intermediate information policy (consisting in releasing some, but not all, information to consumers) can be optimal. In their setup, the optimality of intermediate information relies on overcoming the holdup associated with the costs of going to the store (the Diamond paradox) and so arises through a very different channel from the one we discuss.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Gathering and Marketing

Bar‐Isaac¹,

Caruana²,

Cuñat³

2010

Economics Manag Strategy

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Consumers have only partial knowledge before making a purchase decision, but can choose to acquire more detailed information. A …rm can make it easier or harder for these consumers to obtain such information. We explore consumers'information gathering and the …rm's integrated strategy for marketing, pricing, and investment in quality. In particular, we highlight that when consumers are ex-ante heterogeneous, the …rm might choose an intermediate marketing strategy for two quite di¤erent reasons. First, it serves as a non-price means of discrimination-it can make information only partially available, in a way that induces some, but not all, consumers to acquire the information. Second, when the …rm cannot commit to a given investment in quality, it can still convince all consumers of its provision by designing a pricing and marketing policy that induces some consumers to actively gather further information. This mass of consumers, in exchange, is su¢ ciently large to discipline the monopolist to invest in the quality of the product.JEL: D42, D83, L15, M31

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Gathering and Marketing

Bar‐Isaac¹,

Caruana²,

Cuñat³

2010

Economics Manag Strategy

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“…A strong relationship was found between relevant news and satisfaction, indicating that relevant news is a strong factor in influencing positive satisfaction. Based on the existing literature about consumer behavior, when a consumer obtains relevant information about a product or service in advertising, he or she experiences satisfaction and has more tendency to try the product or service (Anderson and Renault, 2006;Holbrook and Batra, 1987;Lazarus, 1982;Olney et al, 1991;Stout and Leckenby, 1986). This research extended this theory by empirically testing the argument in the Agriculture Bank.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…The main role of advertising is to give relevant information (Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy, 1984) about a product or service before customers decide whether to consume it or not (Anderson and Renault, 2006). The relevant information in advertising affects customers' product selection and behavioral intentions .…”

Section: Relevant Newsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating the Impact of Advertising on Customers’ Behavioral Intentions A Case of Agriculture Bank

Momeni¹,

Safarzadeh

Furuzandeh

2013

Business and Economic Research

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Advertising is one of the important communication tools in business. Success or failure in many organizations and companies is related to the quality of advertising activities. In a large complex industrial society, in addition to face to face communication, there is also a need for indirect communication. Therefore, advertising can meet the need of such a society. Due to the important role of advertising, its budget has been increasing in various Iranian organizations. In ISSN 2162-4860 2013 www.macrothink.org/ber 2 developed countries advertising is considered very important and costly, but in undeveloped ones such as Iran although it is vitally important for economic development, advertising is not scientifically regarded, it is not well-known, and little attention is paid to that. Every year, a lot of money is spent on advertising, and it is essential to make it efficient and effective. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of evaluative dimensions of advertising including relevant news, brand reinforcement, entertainment, empathy, familiarity, and confusion on customers' satisfaction and to examine the impact of customers ' satisfaction on perceived value and behavioral intentions in Agriculture bank. The results showed that among evaluative dimensions of advertising, relevant news and familiarity leave effect on customers' satisfaction. Thus, it can be stated that satisfaction positively influences customers' perceived value and perceived value positively impacts on customers' behavioral intention. Business and Economic Research

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“…This is also the sense in which we use the term. Such scenarios are increasingly common in the information economy, and it is therefore unsurprising that persuasion has been the subject of a large body of work in recent years, motivated by domains as varied as auctions [9,25,24,10], advertising [3,33,17], voting [2], security [46,42], multiarmed bandits [37,38], medical research [35], and financial regulation [28,29]. (For an empirical survey of persuasion, we refer the reader to [21]).…”

Section: "One Quarter Of the Gdp Is Persuasion"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion

Dughmi

2016

Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

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Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in the US. This paper examines persuasion through a computational lens, focusing on what is perhaps the most basic and fundamental model in this space: the celebrated Bayesian persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow [34]. Here there are two players, a sender and a receiver. The receiver must take one of a number of actions with a-priori unknown payoff, and the sender has access to additional information regarding the payoffs of the various actions for both players. The sender can commit to revealing a noisy signal regarding the realization of the payoffs of various actions, and would like to do so as to maximize her own payoff in expectation assuming that the receiver rationally acts to maximize his own payoff. When the payoffs of various actions follow a joint distribution (the common prior), the sender's problem is nontrivial, and its computational complexity depends on the representation of this prior.We examine the sender's optimization task in three of the most natural input models for this problem, and essentially pin down its computational complexity in each. When the payoff distributions of the different actions are i.i.d. and given explicitly, we exhibit a polynomial-time (exact) algorithmic solution, and a "simple" (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm. Our optimal scheme for the i.i.d. setting involves an analogy to auction theory, and makes use of Border's characterization of the space of reduced-forms for single-item auctions. When action payoffs are independent but non-identical with marginal distributions given explicitly, we show that it is #P-hard to compute the optimal expected sender utility. In doing so, we rule out a generalized Border's theorem, as defined by Gopalan et al [30], for this setting. Finally, we consider a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution of action payoffs presented by a black box sampling oracle, and exhibit a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) with a bi-criteria guarantee. Our FPTAS is based on Monte-Carlo sampling, and its analysis relies on the principle of deferred decisions. Moreover, we show that this result is the best possible in the black-box model for information-theoretic reasons.

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Advertising Content

Cited by 239 publications

References 32 publications

Information Gathering and Marketing

Information Gathering and Marketing

Investigating the Impact of Advertising on Customers’ Behavioral Intentions A Case of Agriculture Bank

Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion

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