Readings in Formal Epistemology 2016
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_24
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Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty

Abstract: We develop a new version of prospect theory that employs cumulative rather than separable decision weights and extends the theory in several respects. This version, called cumulative prospect theory, applies to uncertain as well as to risky prospects with any number of outcomes, and it allows different weighting functions for gains and for losses. Two principles, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion, are invoked to explain the characteristic curvature of the value function and the weighting functions. A r… Show more

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Cited by 2,351 publications
(4,830 citation statements)
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References 42 publications
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“…First, attitudes to risks borne by others have not yet been introduced into economic theory. 4 Second, there is ample evidence from descriptive decision theory that risk propensity differs with respect to gains and losses (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). As most theory models of talent allocation include risky payoffs with losses for others, there is thus a need for an experimental analysis of social risk taking with negative externalities, which, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to provide.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…First, attitudes to risks borne by others have not yet been introduced into economic theory. 4 Second, there is ample evidence from descriptive decision theory that risk propensity differs with respect to gains and losses (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). As most theory models of talent allocation include risky payoffs with losses for others, there is thus a need for an experimental analysis of social risk taking with negative externalities, which, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to provide.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Because risk propensity varies with respect to gains and losses (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), we replicate Treatment 2 with a negative prize . This generates the following expected payoffs for Treatment 3:…”
Section: Decision Tasksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, bequest motives cannot explain patterns of nearly no annuitization and/or choice of period certain guarantees among people without heirs. A different explanation for the popularity of period certain options can be found by considering the decision using concepts from cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). For example, loss aversion may make annuities unattractive when consumers perceive the forfeiture of the annuity purchase price due to early death as a loss either to themselves or their family and heirs (Hu and Scott 2007).…”
Section: The Role Of Annuities In Consumer Decumulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To test whether participants' decisions are consistent with non-linear probability weighting (see Berns et al, 2007, for more detail), we estimated values for γ in a standard specification for non-linear weighting (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992): Across all 37 subjects, the estimated median value was 0.685 for γ and was thus consistent with an inverted S-shaped probability weighting function, and with previous studies. We also considered the incidence of common-ratio-violations.…”
Section: Probability Weightingmentioning
confidence: 66%
“…We choose y 0 as the activation associated with p = 1/3 for our study in light of an extensive behavioral literature on probability weighting in the financial domain suggesting that the probability weighting function crosses the diagonal in the vicinity of p = 0.4 (Abdellaoui, 2000;Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;Tversky & Kahneman, 1992;Wu & Gonzalez, 1996). In our experiment, the probability prospect that came closest to meeting these requirements was p = 1/3.…”
Section: Probability Weightingmentioning
confidence: 99%