Administrative Costs and Instrument Choice for Stochastic Non-point Source Pollutants

Kampas, Athanasios; White, Ben

doi:10.1023/b:eare.0000017275.44350.e5

Cited by 47 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 90 publications

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“…Finally, it is worth mentioning that more accurate analysis are needed in order to take also into account monitoring and transaction costs and the existence of imperfect information (Kampas and White, 2004;Ozanne and White, 2007). All of them are key issues when these policy instruments are to be implemented in real agricultural systems.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of policy instruments for control of nitrate pollution in irrigated agriculture in Castilla y León, Spain

Gallego-Ayala

Gómez‐Limón

2009

Span. j. agric. res.

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Irrigated agriculture is one of the most important sources of nitrate pollution of water resources. For this reason, during the past decade, various policies have been proposed in order to prevent this negative impact of farming activities. The aim of this work is therefore to analyze the effects of the joint application of the last Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) reform with different policy instruments designed to mitigate nitrate pollution. To this end, models based on Positive Mathematical Programming have been developed to enable simulating irrigators' productive behaviour in the event of the implementation of these instruments. The results indicate that the latest CAP reform (partial decoupling of subsidies) will by itself lead to an important reduction in nitrate pollution. If this reduction is not regarded as being sufficient, other specific policy instruments could further reduce this source of pollution. In this sense, the most suitable one could be the application of nitrogen fertilization quotas.Additional key words: agricultural policy, economic instruments, environmental policy, positive mathematical programming. ResumenAnálisis de instrumentos políticos para el control de la contaminación por nitratos de la agricultura de regadío en Castilla y León (España) La agricultura de regadío es una de las principales fuentes de contaminación por nitratos de los recursos hídricos. Por este motivo en los últimos años han surgido diferentes políticas encaminadas a evitar esta externalidad negativa de la actividad agraria. En este sentido, el objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los efectos de la aplicación conjunta de la última reforma de la Política Agraria Común (PAC) y diferentes instrumentos políticos mitigadores de la contaminación por nitratos. Para ello se han empleado modelos de simulación basados en la programación matemática positiva, los cuales permiten simular el comportamiento productivo de los regantes frente a la hipotética implementación de tales instrumentos. Los resultados obtenidos ponen de manifiesto que esta externalidad negativa va a reducirse de forma significativa gracias a la última reforma de la PAC (desacoplamiento parcial de las ayudas). Si esta reducción no se considerase suficiente, otros instrumentos específicos permitirían una reducción adicional de esta fuente de contaminación. En este sentido el instrumento que puede resultar más adecuado es el establecimiento de límites máximos a la fertilización nitrogenada.Palabras clave adicionales: instrumentos económicos, política agraria, política ambiental, programación matemática positiva.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of policy instruments for control of nitrate pollution in irrigated agriculture in Castilla y León, Spain

Gallego-Ayala

Gómez‐Limón

2009

Span. j. agric. res.

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“…However, there appears to be little general understanding regarding how producers can be motivated to account for their nutrient emissions, particularly in the context of pastoral agriculture (Monaghan et al 2007a). This difficulty is promoted in the presence of soil heterogeneity and pervasive stochastic processes (Kampas and White 2004). The importance of sound regulatory decision making highlights a key role for economic analysis, through which the relative cost of alternative policy instruments can be assessed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The analysis considers the inherent variability of N leaching and ambient N loads. Stochasticity is an important feature of nonpoint pollution (Kampas and White 2004), but one that has not been studied previously with regard to N leaching from NZ dairy farms. Nevertheless, policy targets are based on deterministic, measured outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cost‐effective regulation of nonpoint emissions from pastoral agriculture: a stochastic analysis

Doole

Romera

2013

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

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Nutrient emissions from pastoral agriculture are a global cause of declining water quality. Their management is complicated through variability arising from climate and soil influences. This paper compares the implications of input-based policies and direct restrictions on leaching to achieve 10 and 20 per cent reductions in nitrogen (N) load, in the context of pasture-based New Zealand dairy farms. The most important mitigation practices on these farms are de-intensification (involving reductions in N fertiliser application and stocking rate) and the application of nitrification inhibitors. A stylised conceptual model, incorporating both sources of variability, is used to identify the implications of alternative policies. Direct restriction of estimated N leaching is the most cost-effective policy to reduce N leaching by 10 and 20 per cent. These results indicate the general insufficiency of input-based mechanisms for water quality improvement, given the low correlation between input use and leaching, possible substitution with unrestricted inputs and their failure to motivate the use of mitigation strategies. Additionally, model output indicates that inherent variability in water quality, mainly due to climate influences, can dominate the benefits of regulatory action in any given year.

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“…1 1 Others have investigated how administrative costs can affect the relative efficiency of taxes and other policy instruments. For example, Kampas and White (2004) provide an empirical analysis of the relative efficiency of several different policies for the control of an agricultural nonpoint 3 While it is well known that administrative costs can be important determinants of the design and performance of environmental policies, in the literature on emissions taxes the distribution of administrative costs between the public (via government regulators) and polluting firms is taken for granted. No one to our knowledge has addressed the question of who should bear the administrative costs associated with emissions taxes, the public, regulated pollution sources, or some combination.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who should bear the administrative costs of an emissions tax?

Stranlund

Chávez

2013

J Regul Econ

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Abstract:All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it is optimal to make the pollution sources bear all of the administrative costs. A necessary, but not sufficient, reason for having the public bear part of the cost burden is if aggregate emissions decrease as a result. Abstract: All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it is optimal to make the pollution sources bear all of the administrative costs. A necessary, but not sufficient, reason for having the public bear part of the cost burden is if aggregate emissions decrease as a result.

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Administrative Costs and Instrument Choice for Stochastic Non-point Source Pollutants

Cited by 47 publications

References 90 publications

Analysis of policy instruments for control of nitrate pollution in irrigated agriculture in Castilla y León, Spain

Analysis of policy instruments for control of nitrate pollution in irrigated agriculture in Castilla y León, Spain

Cost‐effective regulation of nonpoint emissions from pastoral agriculture: a stochastic analysis

Who should bear the administrative costs of an emissions tax?

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