Adaptive Preferences and Capabilities: Some Preliminary Conceptual Explorations

Abstract

The Capability Approach (CA) as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, has in part been a response to the problem of adaptive preferences. Their argument says that people might adapt to certain unfavorable circumstances and any self-evaluation in terms of satisfaction or happiness will in this case necessarily be distorted. To evaluate people's well-being in terms of functionings and capabilities guarantees a more objective picture of people's life. Next to this strong criticism on subjective measurements of well-being, we observe an increasing interest in Subjective Well-Being (SWB) or Happiness studies that are included in the broader field of Hedonic Psychology. In this paper, we thus revise the original critique of adaptive preferences and compare it with a more detailed analysis of adaptation as it is presented in hedonic psychology. It becomes clear that adaptation can be a positive as well as a negative phenomenon and that the adaptive preference critique had a particular narrow view on adaptation. However, this does not mean SWB-research is not any longer susceptible to this critique. An alternative way to assess people's subjective well-being, but which could be considered to be more in line with the CA, is proposed by Daniel Kahneman's Objective Happiness. These are all relatively new considerations, especially in economics. Therefore much more research needs to be done on the positive and negative aspects of adaptation to understand its consequences on well-being - especially when evaluated within the capability-space.functionings, capabilities, adaptation, subjective well-being, objective happiness,

Aspirations and Human Development Interventions

“…For a long time, scholars have been reflecting on the fact that aspirations and preferences can be adapted, and discussing which normative and political issues adaptation raises, both theoretically as well as in the context of development (for example, Elster, 1983, Sen, 1985b1992, p. 55;Nussbaum, 2000;Teschl and Comim, 2005;Burchardt, 2009;Clark, 2009Clark, , 2012aClark, , 2012bKhader, 2009). Yet there is a variety of ways in which 'adaptation' can be understood, and the different conceptualizations have consequences for which preferences will be identified as 'adapted' and which will not.…”

Does Capability Deprivation Hurt? – Evidence from German Panel Data

“…Therefore, some circumstances are difficult if not im- is in principle a question of available data, deprivations over the whole lifetime, in contrast, escape from such a within-variation-based analysis. Second, as Teschl and Comim (2005) point out, that adaptation may well vary by domain, because comparing functioning achievements is easier for some than for others (e.g., health is easier to compare than the degree of autonomy in agency). Therefore, generalisations regarding both the domain of and the reason for deprivation should be treated with caution.…”

“…The CA-based studies on adaptation focus more on conceptual issues and implications for normative exercises like evaluation and assessment of well-being, poverty, and the like. See in particular Teschl and Comim (2005) and Clark (2009). Finally, psychological studies of adaptation scrutinize, for instance, the process, domain, and conditions of adaptation; see Frederick and Loewenstein (2003).…”

The perfectionism of Nussbaum's adaptive preferences

“…In recent years, development studies has seen a surge of interest in the idea that people's preferences may adapt to circumstances of deprivation (Clark 2009;Khader 2009;Khader 2011;Teschl & Comim 2005;Clark et al 2012). The concept of adaptive preferences, however, is at once extremely useful and deeply problematic.…”