The perfectionism of Nussbaum's adaptive preferences

Terlazzo, Rosa

doi:10.1080/17449626.2014.931874

Cited by 23 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…If we believe that the badness outweighs the goodness, the adaptation in question is bad, all things considered. This solution runs into the problem that we perhaps fail to show A what Rosa Terlazzo ( 2014 ) calls secondary recognition respect: we fail to recognize A as an authority on their own good. Any objective theory will plausibly run into this problem.…”

Section: Returning To “Bad” Adaptationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptation and illness severity: the significance of suffering

Jølstad

2023

Med Health Care and Philos

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Adaptation to illness, and its relevance for distribution in health care, has been the subject of vigorous debate. In this paper I examine an aspect of this discussion that seems so far to have been overlooked: that some illnesses are difficult, or even impossible, to adapt to. This matters because adaptation reduces suffering. Illness severity is a priority setting criterion in several countries. When considering severity, we are interested in the extent to which an illness makes a person worse-off. I argue that no plausible theory of well-being can disregard suffering when determining to what extent someone is worse-off in terms of health. We should accept, all else equal, that adapting to an illness makes the illness less severe by reducing suffering. Accepting a pluralist theory of well-being allows us to accept my argument, while still making room for the possibility that adaptation is sometimes, all things considered, bad. Finally, I argue that we should conceptualize adaptability as a feature of illness, and thereby account for adaptation on a group level for the purposes of priority setting.

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Section: Returning To “Bad” Adaptationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptation and illness severity: the significance of suffering

Jølstad

2023

Med Health Care and Philos

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“…But a problem arises in cases in which people continue to prefer options that are deemed flourishing incompatible even when "better" options are made available. People with this kind of "deep" adaptive preference will be forced by a substantive account to make the impossible choice between giving up (or at least lying about) their own sincere convictions about their own good, and living their lives in the knowledge that their political community judges them to be a failed or defective agent when it comes to judgments of that good (Terlazzo, 2014(Terlazzo, , 2016. Those who endorse autonomy-based accounts of adaptive preferences can at least (sometimes) allow that those who are (rightly or wrongly) judged to have adaptive preferences can vindicate their judgments about their own good by undergoing whatever process of reflection (or opportunity for exploration, or whatever else) their account of autonomy requires.…”

Section: How Can the Concept Of Adaptive Preferences Harm Political S...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive preferences in political philosophy

Terlazzo

2021

Philosophy Compass

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The concept of adaptive preferences is supposed to explain how and why victims of injustice might come to endorse their own oppression, and to provide political philosophers with a tool for objecting to that oppression even when its victims do not. Critics, however, argue that using the concept of adaptive preferences further harms the victims of injustice, by denying them the respect owed to moral agents and/or the opportunity to direct the course of their own lives. After canvassing this debate, I consider one proposal for retaining the concept as a helpful political tool while avoiding the harms that detractors point to. This proposal allows us to make different well‐being judgments about adaptive preferences before and after they have been formed. I conclude by considering the parallel literature on adaptive preferences and disability, noting the possible short‐comings of the proposal in that case, and suggesting a variety of ways for moving forward.

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“… 3 Rosa Terlazzo (2014) analysed the concept of adaptive preferences implicitly underlying Nussbaum's works. For an alternative account of adaptive preferences and a recent discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of that notion, cf.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Functionings represent individuals' concrete ways of being or acting, what they are and what they doin other words, the actual ways of performing one's functions: being well nourished or not, taking part in public life or not, etc. Capabilities, on the other hand, define one's own potential, what one can be and what one can do, or rather their possibility of functioning in certain 3 Rosa Terlazzo (2014) analysed the concept of adaptive preferences implicitly underlying Nussbaum's works. For an alternative account of adaptive preferences and a recent discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of that notion, cf.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Role of Emotions in the Capabilities Approach: A Critical Analysis

Sacco

2024

Philosophy

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The capabilities approach is the theory according to which, in order to assess people's quality of life and reflect on the basic political entitlements, we should consider what people are capable of doing and being. Focusing mostly on Nussbaum's account, a number of scholars analysed the metaethical structure underlying the approach, showing her Aristotelian and Kantian sources. This article explores another aspect of Nussbaum's theory which has so far been somewhat overlooked: the role of emotions in the justification and motivational support of the approach. After showing the importance Nussbaum places on compassion (and other benevolent emotions) to warrant her moral theory, I argue that – assuming her own cognitive account of compassion – her argument begs the question. I will then contend that Nussbaum's case does not have the inner tools to overcome such a circularity, trying to suggest, in conclusion, a possible way out which is consistent with it.

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The perfectionism of Nussbaum's adaptive preferences

Cited by 23 publications

References 32 publications

Adaptation and illness severity: the significance of suffering

Adaptation and illness severity: the significance of suffering

Adaptive preferences in political philosophy

The Role of Emotions in the Capabilities Approach: A Critical Analysis

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