Adam Smith on What Is Wrong with Economic Inequality

Abstract

This article explores Adam Smith's attitude toward economic inequality, as distinct from the problem of poverty, and argues that he regarded it as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, as has often been recognized, Smith saw a high degree of economic inequality as an inevitable result of a flourishing commercial society, and he considered a certain amount of such inequality to be positively useful as a means of encouraging productivity and bolstering political stability. On the other hand, it has seldom been noticed that Smith also expressed deep worries about some of the other effects of extreme economic inequality—worries that are, moreover, interestingly different from those that dominate contemporary discourse. In Smith's view, extreme economic inequality leads people to sympathize more fully and readily with the rich than the poor, and this distortion in our sympathies in turn undermines both morality and happiness.

Commitment, Work Engagement, and Research Performance of Lecturers, in Indonesia Private Universities

“…Ganieva, Sayfutdinova, Yunusova, Sadovaya, and Neile (2015) state that lecturers are required to increase their competency. In terms of motivation, according to Rasmussen (2016), productivity of lecturers' research is influenced by many factors including motivation (Edgar & Geare, 2013), reward systems (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), commitment and intrinsic motivation (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014). Fitzmaurice (2013) states that the basis actions of a lecturer who is active in research, namely value, virtue, individual trust, joy, satisfaction in conducting research.…”

Observed without Sympathy: Adam Smith on Inequality and Spectatorship

“…We strive to improve our socioeconomic status to acquire the sympathetic attention of spectators. Smith highlights the uniquely painful anonymity that people living in poverty experience, being ignored by the rest of the community, and, therefore, closed off from even the possibility of mutual sympathy (I.iii.2.1, 51; see also Rasmussen 2016, 350–51). However, Smith later suggests a bright side to life in obscurity in his claim of the “ease of body and peace of mind” of “the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway” (IV.i.10, 185).…”

“…Consequently, enjoying an audience, and experiencing that audience as a source of pleasure and power, is a benefit asymmetrically conferred onto the socioeconomically advantaged (see also Marshall 1986, 186–87). Though Smith ultimately accepts the public's easy admiration of the wealthy as conducive to political stability (VI.ii.1.20, 226; see also Rasmussen 2016, 344, 347), he notes the problems it poses with respect to holding rulers accountable (I.iii.2.3, 53) and criticizes it as a major source of moral corruption.…”

“…However, seeing how others admire the wealthy, and desiring the sympathetic attention that spectators give them, many members of the middle and lower social ranks are apt to emulate them. Since “even their vices and follies are fashionable,” this admiring imitation spreads moral corruption throughout the community (I.iii.3.7, 64; Rasmussen 2016, 348–49).…”

“…Considering the contrast between Smith's “picture of the poor” and the perspectives of his contemporaries, we should not be surprised to see inequality play a central role in his account of spectatorship. Although Smith's model of moral judgment, the impartial spectator, embraces the moral equality of all people (1982 III.3.4, 137; see also Anderson 2016; Fleischacker 2013), Smith recognizes that actual spectators more easily empathize with joy and wealth than with distress and poverty; consequently, we tend to “admire” the wealthy and “to despise, or at least, to neglect” the poor (I.iii.2.1–4, 50–54; I.iii.3.1–8, 61–66; see also Rasmussen 2016). Smith blames this social psychological phenomenon for the “corruption of our moral sentiments” (I.iii.3.1, 61).…”