Active Synchronous Detection of Deception Attacks in Microgrid Control Systems

Li, Yan; Zhang, Peng; Zhang, Liang; Wang, Bing

doi:10.1109/tsg.2016.2614884

Cited by 47 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…It can be seen from Fig. 7(a) that by cutting off the branch (10, 11), (10,32), (19,33), (20,34), or (23,36) at the beginning, the government will pay much more for repairing the system after cascading failures. Comparing these two lines, we can also draw the conclusion that the weighted adjustment is more economical than the average one.…”

Section: Simulation In Case 2 Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…the IEEE 118-bus system (including 54 generators, 54 loads, and 186 branches) is considered as a large standard test system to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model approach [2]. It is assumed that utilities are divided into six regions, as 10 (a) 7 8 Cost/100 MVA shown in Fig. 9.…”

Section: Computational Complexity In This Sectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, cyber attacks of ECPSs have become a serious problem, which needs to be solved . According to the Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Team reports , major cyber threats (such as cyber attacks and computer worms ) against critical cyber‐physical infrastructures have increased from nine incidents in 2009 to 257 intrusions in 2013.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A new model approach of electrical cyber physical systems considering cyber security

Wang

Yan

2018

IEEJ Transactions Elec Engng

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The integration of modern computing and advanced communication technologies with power grids has led to the emergence of electrical cyber physical systems (ECPSs). However, with the massive applications of communication technologies, power grids are becoming more vulnerable to cyber attacks, and there is no general model for analyzing the influence of such attacks. This paper focuses on modeling ECPSs considering cyber security. A multiple characteristic association (MCA) approach is proposed for analyzing cascading failures and cyber attacks based on the DC power flow model. It can comprehensively and qualitatively formulate the characteristics of power grids, communication facilities, and their interdependent relationships. The proposed model approach has good expansibility when analyzing the mechanism and impacts of cyber attacks. Three possible cyber attack scenarios (denial‐of‐service attack, uplink spoofing attack, and downlink spoofing attack) are qualitatively studied. Simulation results with IEEE systems verify that cyber attacks happening on information uplinks or downlinks have different impacts on power grids. © 2018 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Section: Simulation In Case 2 Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Computational Complexity In This Sectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A new model approach of electrical cyber physical systems considering cyber security

Wang

Yan

2018

IEEJ Transactions Elec Engng

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“…By now, securing the automatic control systems of microgrids against cyber-attacks is still at an early stage. There are many open technical challenges to be addressed, such as risk assessment [8], intrusion detection [9,10], and attack - 1 mitigation [11][12][13]. Among a variety of cyber attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks and false data injection (FDI) attacks are most reported and investigated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game theoretic vulnerability management for secondary frequency control of islanded microgrids against false data injection attacks

Liu

Chen

2021

IET Cyber-Phy Sys Theory & Ap

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While most existing works ignore securing the communication of control signals in microgrids' centralized secondary frequency control, here, a stochastic game between the microgrid control centre (MGCC) and the attacker for enhancing the vulnerability of the MGCC to false data injection (FDI) attack (wireless spoof attack) is proposed. The vulnerability to wireless spoof attack is assessed based on the controllability Gramian when the FDI attack is modelled as the malicious control input that aims to drive the microgrid state to undesired values. In the formulated zero-sum two-player Markov game, the state is uniquely associated with the vulnerability index defined by the trace of the controllability Gramian with respect to the attack input. Moreover, the utility function of the stochastic game includes not only the costs related to conducting spoof attack and encryption actions but also the possible remedy costs associated with the resulted vulnerability levels. In turn, the potential impacts of the cyber-layer action choices on the performance of the physical power system are considered when designing the optimal attack and defence strategies. A distribution feeder system with four distributed generators (DGs) is used for simulation studies. The vulnerability assessment results show that the vulnerability level increases when the attacker compromises more on the communication links between the MGCC and DGs. In the simulated game, mixed stationary attack and defence strategies are predominate when considering the uncertainty of the other player.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

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“…The quadratic control issues toward CPSs under replay attacks were discussed in Reference 10. Resilient control and estimation design for CPSs under DI attacks has been systematically studied in References 11‐15.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Active resilient control for two‐dimensional systems under denial‐of‐service attacks

Shi

2020

Intl J Robust & Nonlinear

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SummaryAs the backbone of Industrial 4.0, cyber‐physical systems (CPSs) are widely applicable in industrial processes. In this paper, a resilient control is designed for a class of two‐dimensional (2D) CPSs with the occurrence of Denial‐of‐Service (DoS) attacks. Firstly, we model the physical layer of CPSs as a 2D Fornasini‐Marchesini plant and set up the stability issue as preliminaries. Next, for CPSs suffering from DoS attacks, under which the controller operating in the fog layer is attacked by adversaries, sufficient conditions are established to guarantee the exponential stability of the underlying systems, and the corresponding switched control is designed to make a prescribed system performance is satisfied. Finally, an example is given to illustrate the effectiveness and potential of the proposed design methods.

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Active Synchronous Detection of Deception Attacks in Microgrid Control Systems

Cited by 47 publications

References 5 publications

A new model approach of electrical cyber physical systems considering cyber security

A new model approach of electrical cyber physical systems considering cyber security

Game theoretic vulnerability management for secondary frequency control of islanded microgrids against false data injection attacks

Active resilient control for two‐dimensional systems under denial‐of‐service attacks

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