Action–effect knowledge transfers to similar effect stimuli

Abstract

The ability to anticipate the sensory consequences of our actions (i.e., action–effects) is known to be important for intentional action initiation and control. Learned action–effects can select the responses that previously have been associated with them. What has been largely unexplored is how learned action–effect associations can aid action selection for effects that have not previously associated with an action but are similar to learned effects. In two studies, we aimed to show that when presented new, unknown action–effects, participants select the responses that have previously been associated with similar action–effects. In the first study (n = 27), action–effect similarity was operationalized via stimuli belonging to the same or different categories as the previously learned action–effects. In the second study (n = 31), action–effect similarity was realized via stimuli that require comparable motor responses in real life. Participants first learned that specific responses are followed by specific visual effect stimuli. In the test phase, learned effect stimuli, new but similar effect stimuli and new but dissimilar effect stimuli were presented ahead of the response. The findings revealed that both learned effect stimuli and new similar effect stimuli affected response times, whereas new dissimilar effects did not. When a learned or a new similar effect was followed by a learned response, compared to an unlearned response, the responses were faster. We interpret these findings in terms of action–effect learning. The action–effect once bound to an action is used to select an action if a similar effect for which no action has been learned yet is presented. However, it is noteworthy that, due to our design, other explanations for the found transfer are conceivable. We address these limitations in the General Discussion.

Generalisation of unpredictable action-effect features: Large individual differences with little on-average effect

“…This compatibility effect was of the same size for both learning groups, indicating that a generalisation from the subordinate exemplar level (e.g., “chair”) to the superordinate category level (e.g., “furniture”) had occurred ( Rosch et al, 1976 ). These results were generalised to within-category exemplars and perceptual similarity in two further experiments (see also Esser et al, 2023 ; but see Eichfelder et al, 2023 , for an unsuccessful attempt to replicate).…”

Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology

“…Results showing that anticipation of the action-effect interval duration prolongs initiation of the action (Dignath & Janczyk, 2017 ; Dignath et al, 2014 ) are in line with timing research suggesting that interval discrimination/production can be coded in terms of absolute durations operating on modal representation (e.g., Bartolo & Merchant, 2009 ; Wright et al, 1997 ), although more research is needed to test this idea in action control. Likewise, the idea that action planning is based on abstract, amodal representations is not fully compatible with recent studies targeting generalization in response-effect learning and compatibility (see Eichfelder et al, 2023 ; Janczyk & Miller, 2023 ; Koch et al, 2021 ; but see Esser et al, 2023 , and Hommel et al, 2003 ). Other studies have indicated that the execution of unskilled actions is similar to the execution of skilled actions (in terms of Garner interference 8 ; see Eloka et al, 2015 ; Janczyk et al, 2010 ), in contrast to what is assumed by the perception–action model (e.g., Ganel & Goodale, 2003 ), further challenging the idea of a qualitative difference between modal (i.e., here: analytical) control of skilled actions and amodal (i.e., here: holistic) control of unskilled actions.…”