Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology

Abstract

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Differences in perceptual representations in multilinguals’ first, second, and third language

“…One of the most significant debates in the field of cognitive science concerns the nature of the mental representation of concepts. The debate centers on the question of whether the conceptual representation is symbolic or perceptual ( Kaup et al, 2024 ).…”