Action bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The case of penalty kicks

Abstract

In soccer penalty kicks, goalkeepers choose their action before they can clearly observe the kick direction. An analysis of 286 penalty kicks in top leagues and championships worldwide shows that given the probability distribution of kick direction, the optimal strategy for goalkeepers is to stay in the goal's center. Goalkeepers, however, almost always jump right or left. We propose the following explanation for this behavior: because the norm is to jump, norm theory (Kahneman and Miller, 1986) implies that a goal scored yields worse feelings for the goalkeeper following inaction (staying in the center) than following action (jumping), leading to a bias for action. The omission bias, a bias in favor of inaction, is reversed here because the norm here is reversed -to act rather than to choose inaction. The claim that jumping is the norm is supported by a second study, a survey conducted with 32 top professional goalkeepers. The seemingly biased decision making is particularly striking since the goalkeepers have huge incentives to make correct decisions, and it is a decision they encounter frequently. Finally, we discuss several implications of the action/omission bias for economics and management.2

Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games

“…Since the ball reaches the target in 0.2-0.3 s [12], the goalkeeper cannot postpone the decision until the trajectory of the ball is clear, and must make the choice while opponent is preparing the shot. Thus, a simultaneous game could be used as a crude model for such interactions (see, for instance, [13,14]).…”

“…However, in practice, both players observe each other's behaviour and try to anticipate the direction of the kick or of the goalkeeper's jump from subtle preparatory cues [6]. Thanks to these observations, professional goalkeepers manage to use their tiny temporal advantage and predict the direction of the shot better than chance [12][13][14]. The advantage of a professional goalkeeper over an amateur kicker would result in even better prediction of the shooting direction.…”

Serial correlation in National Football League play calling and its effects on outcomes

“…In contrast, Bar-Eli et al (2007) examine the behavior of soccer goalkeepers in penalty kicks, where the action choice is either to dive to the left, dive to the right, or stay in the middle of the goal. The authors …nd that the frequency with which goalkeepers stay in the middle is excessively small.…”

Uncertainty in macroeconomic policy-making: art or science?

“…[19]). In a sporting setting, goalkeepers facing penalties tend to dive, rather than stay in the middle of the goal, more than the direction of penalties suggests is appropriate [20]. Such types of behaviour reflect the fact that people are unwilling to risk failure by pursuing strategies that are different from the norm.…”