Achieving greater cooperation in a noisy prisoner’s dilemma: an experimental investigation

Sainty, Barbara

doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00049-9

Cited by 16 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The trembling hand equilibrium was first specified analytically by Selten (1975) and assumes that players might play the off equilibrium strategy because of a "slip of the hand." Prisoner's dilemma games that incorporate trembling treatments into the design show that when players cannot infer the intentions of others with certainty, they will sometimes give each other the benefit of the doubt when noncooperative outcomes occur (Bendor et al 1991, Sainty 1999). In the standard prisoner's dilemma game, when one player knows the other has defected, the equilibrium response is for the second mover to also defect, following a tit-for-tat strategy.…”

Section: Uncertainty In the Transaction Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation and Uncertainty in Online Markets: An Experimental Study

Rice

2012

Information Systems Research

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T his paper employs a modified investment game to study how online reputation ratings are assigned, and thus how electronic reputations are formed in transactions where buyers and sellers interact anonymously. Of particular interest are the important questions of how online reputations evolve and how specific reputation information is interpreted by market participants. We vary the level of uncertainty in the transaction environment, and measure the effects of this manipulation on buyers' trust and their subsequent rating behaviors. We distinguish between a reputation mechanism and specific reputation information, finding the former has an association with the overall decision of whether to transact in the marketplace, while the latter shows significance in purchase decisions regarding specific sellers. We also find that aggregate reputation information is weighted differently than singular reputation information. Finally, we show that when reputations are increasingly noisy, buyers are less likely to react negatively to poor ratings and are more likely to give sellers the benefit of the doubt when seemingly uncooperative outcomes occur.

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Section: Uncertainty In the Transaction Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation and Uncertainty in Online Markets: An Experimental Study

Rice

2012

Information Systems Research

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“…The other extension to the classical IPD is the consideration of noise, i.e., misinterpretations or mistakes, which is used to model uncertainty in behavioral interactions [14]- [19]. Julstrom [20] studied noise in the classic two-choice IPD.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral Diversity, Choices and Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Chong¹,

Yao²

2005

IEEE Trans. Evol. Computat.

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Abstract-Real-world dilemmas rarely involve just two choices and perfect interactions without mistakes. In the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game, intermediate choices or mistakes (noise) have been introduced to extend its realism. This paper studies the IPD game with both noise and multiple levels of cooperation (intermediate choices) in a coevolutionary environment, where players can learn and adapt their strategies through an evolutionary algorithm. The impact of noise on the evolution of cooperation is first examined. It is shown that the coevolutionary models presented in this paper are robust against low noise (when mistakes occur with low probability). That is, low levels of noise have little impact on the evolution of cooperation. On the other hand, high noise (when mistakes occur with high probability) creates misunderstandings and discourages cooperation. However, the evolution of cooperation in the IPD with more choices in a coevolutionary learning setting also depends on behavioral diversity. This paper further investigates the issue of behavioral diversity in the coevolution of strategies for the IPD with more choices and noise. The evolution of cooperation is more difficult to achieve if a coevolutionary model with low behavioral diversity is used for IPD games with higher levels of noise. The coevolutionary model with high behavioral diversity in the population is more resistant to noise. It is shown that strategy representations can have a significant impact on the evolutionary outcomes because of different behavioral diversities that they generate. The results further show the importance of behavioral diversity in coevolutionary learning.

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“…if there is random error either in choosing actions or in monitoring others' actions; see e.g. Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion, 1988;Jonathan Bendor, 1987;Bendor, 1993;Edward Green and Robert Porter, 1984;Per Molander, 1985;Miller, 1996;Barbara Sainty, 1999. That is, if actions are noisy, a player does not know whether another player's defection was an error or an intended choice, and strategies involving reciprocation (e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation

Bereby‐Meyer

Roth

2006

American Economic Review

137

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In an experiment, players' ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner's dilemma was substantially diminished when the payoffs were noisy, even though players could monitor one another's past actions perfectly. In contrast, in one-time play against a succession of opponents, noisy payoffs increased cooperation, by slowing the rate at which cooperation decays. These observations are consistent with the robust observation from the psychology literature that partial reinforcement (adding randomness to the link between an action and its consequences while holding expected payoffs constant) slows learning. This effect is magnified in the repeated game: When others are slow to learn to cooperate, the benefits of cooperation are reduced, which further hampers cooperation.These results show that a small change in the payoff environment, which changes the speed of individual learning, can have a large effect on collective behavior. And they show that there may be interesting comparative dynamics that can be derived from careful attention to the fact that at least some economic behavior is learned from experience.Acknowledgements: This research has been partially supported by a grant from the

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Achieving greater cooperation in a noisy prisoner’s dilemma: an experimental investigation

Cited by 16 publications

References 14 publications

Reputation and Uncertainty in Online Markets: An Experimental Study

Reputation and Uncertainty in Online Markets: An Experimental Study

Behavioral Diversity, Choices and Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation

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