Accounting-based earnings management: motivations, players, implementation, and detection from the perspective of certified accountants

Abstract

In the scope of Behavioral Decision Theory, Accounting-based Earnings Management (AEM) may compromise the success of decision making of a firm’s stakeholders. Given that AEM constitutes a barrier to the decision-making process, we aim to identify the main motivations of the players of AEM. Besides, in this study we also intend to analyze the implementing and detecting of AEM practices in financial statements and to evaluate whether individual characteristics influence the ability to implement and detect creative accounting practices. To achieve the proposed objectives, a quantitative methodology approach was used. A survey was applied to Portuguese’s certified accountants. In the data analyses, we applied the univariate and multiple analysis. Based on 159 observations, we find that most certified accountants indicate the main motivations are related to the reduction of the cost of capital and tax burden, the strength of the “code law system”, and that the managers are the main players. Our evidence also shows that the AEM practices are easily implemented and detected in the financial statements. In addition, we find that age, professional experience, and academic qualifications of the certified accountant tend to have an impact on the ability to implement AEM in the financial statements, contrary to gender and training area. Furthermore, gender and academic financial statements. This research is important for the development of the literature, entities that operate in accounting standardization and for the users of accounting and financial information. This study contributes to a better understanding of AEM practice, and it originally combines individual characteristics of accounting professionals with AEM practice.

The Role of Ethical Leadership in Constraining Earnings Management Practices: A Survey of Literature

“…The earnings management literature attempts to grasp why managers manipulate earnings (García-Sánchez et al, 2020;Islam et al, 2011;McNichols, 2000). The incentives beyond earnings management have been extensively investigated in several contexts (e.g., Cohen & Malkogianni, 2021;Jiang, 2020;Monteiro et al, 2022;Toumeh et al, 2020). Mayer et al (2012) and Mihelic et al (2010) highlighted that ethical dilemmas are prevalent in the scandals of high profile companies.…”