Accountability for Delegated and Implementing Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon

Peers, Steve; Costa, Marios

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0386.2012.00607.x

Cited by 18 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Delegated and implementing acts are, legally speaking, mutually exclusive: either the one or the other type of act should be used, not both. However, the selection criteria leave room for interpretation (Craig 2011;Peers and Costa 2012). When delegating powers to change legislative annexes, the choice is clear: annexes are non-essential elements of the legislative act, and therefore delegated acts must be used.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling delegated powers in the post-Lisbon European Union

Brandsma

Blom‐Hansen²

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Most EU rules are made by the Commission, not the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. But although the Commission is an important rule-maker, it is not autonomous. The member states have always taken care to install committees to control the Commission ('comitology'). However, the Lisbon Treaty introduced alternative control mechanisms (delegated acts) and a reform of the comitology system (implementing acts). This article investigates how the post-Lisbon control system works in daily legislative practice. It represents the first investigation of the institutional preferences of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in the new system. Further, it utilizes better data than previous studies. The analysis is based on data on the control preferences of all actors before the first trilogue meeting for a large number of cases in the period 2010-2013. The results indicate that the institutional battle over the control of delegated rulemaking is far from over.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling delegated powers in the post-Lisbon European Union

Brandsma

Blom‐Hansen²

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Pozycja procesowa prokuratora wymaga więc określonego poziomu transparentności 9 i rozliczalności, które są niezbędne dla zapewnienia minimum zaufania społecznego dla prokuratury czy też szerzej dla systemu wymiaru sprawiedliwości w sprawach karnych. Transparentność jest wręcz określana jako alter ego rozliczalności 10 .…”

Section: Role Ustrojowe Prokuraturyunclassified

Rozliczalność prokuratury – ujęcie instytucjonalne

Mistygacz¹

2021

ppk

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…In practice, however, those committees continue to exist as expert groups, which means that they are stripped of their formal voting rights (Brandsma and Blom-Hansen, 2012;Peers and Costa, 2012). Furthermore, limits on adopting a parliamentary veto have been lifted and the Council and the EP may decide to revoke delegated powers to the Commission.…”

Section: The Promise Of Delegated Legislationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Holding the European Commission to account: the promise of delegated acts

Brandsma

2016

International Review of Administrative Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article focuses on a new type of rules that the European Union may adopt: delegated legislation. Although this instrument may be new, it follows from a longstanding controversy over the means by which the European Parliament can hold the European Commission to account when it adopts executive rules. On the basis of interviews and documentary evidence, this article aims to test to what degree the new system delivers on its promise of stronger accountability. Although the new system is still in its infancy, the article concludes that formal rules, internal norms and practices are already indicative of stronger legislative control. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament, as well as a lack of public transparency, may well prove to be detrimental when the number of delegated acts increases. Points for practitionersThis article assesses the degree to which the European Parliament is equipped to hold the European Commission to account when it adopts delegated legislation. Current accountability systems and practices are still in their infancy, but there are already clear signs of stronger legislative control over the European Commission. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament and a lack of transparency of delegated legislation will jeopardize accountability as the number of delegated acts increases.

show abstract

Accountability for Delegated and Implementing Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon

Abstract: This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link

Cited by 18 publications

References 9 publications

Controlling delegated powers in the post-Lisbon European Union

Controlling delegated powers in the post-Lisbon European Union

Rozliczalność prokuratury – ujęcie instytucjonalne

Holding the European Commission to account: the promise of delegated acts

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About