Holding the European Commission to account: the promise of delegated acts

Abstract

This article focuses on a new type of rules that the European Union may adopt: delegated legislation. Although this instrument may be new, it follows from a longstanding controversy over the means by which the European Parliament can hold the European Commission to account when it adopts executive rules. On the basis of interviews and documentary evidence, this article aims to test to what degree the new system delivers on its promise of stronger accountability. Although the new system is still in its infancy, the article concludes that formal rules, internal norms and practices are already indicative of stronger legislative control. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament, as well as a lack of public transparency, may well prove to be detrimental when the number of delegated acts increases. Points for practitionersThis article assesses the degree to which the European Parliament is equipped to hold the European Commission to account when it adopts delegated legislation. Current accountability systems and practices are still in their infancy, but there are already clear signs of stronger legislative control over the European Commission. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament and a lack of transparency of delegated legislation will jeopardize accountability as the number of delegated acts increases.

Crisis, Climate Change and Comitology: Policy Dismantling Via the Backdoor?

“…This detachment raises further questions over the democratic accountability of this growing legislative arena. Moreover, despite recent efforts to simplify the DIA system, it remains a complex, if not arcane, system of policy‐making (Brandsma, ; Georgiev, ) that hinders the transparency of the decision‐making process on sometimes politicised, contested, and often partisan, policy areas, of which climate change continues to be a clear example (Tobin, ). Finally, the simultaneous increase in policy density and the slight diminution in policy intensity since the economic crisis began underscore the rationale for employing both measures to understand changes to policy ambition.…”

“…Only four instances of reduced policy ambition were found, but all occurred since the start of the crisis, of which three were produced via DIA. The increased use of DIA during this 18‐year period provides new empirical evidence for debates surrounding the democratic accountability of EU policy‐making (Brandsma, ; Georgiev, ; Rhinard, ). Thus, this article makes an important methodological contribution by applying its new typology to DIA measures, and generates new empirical findings on EU climate policy‐making, and the extent to which comitology has been used for back‐door dismantling in the crisis era.…”

Legislative Control over Executive Law‐making: Delegation of Quasi‐legislative Powers to the European Commission

“…Given that delegated acts have clearly contrasting effects on the power of legislative scrutiny of each legislator, it is puzzling as to when and why the EP and the EU Council would agree to delegated acts. The answers to these questions could have profound implications for the interinstitutional balance of power in the EU, whose legislation now consists mostly of tertiary acts (Brandsma, , , p. 657, Junge et al, ).…”

The Effect of Removing Voting Rules: Consultation Practices in the Commission's Delegated Act Expert Groups and Comitology Committees

“…The creation of a black box has implications for democratic control of the Commission. While it has become easier for the EP to exercise control over the Commission in the realm of delegated acts, it is not able to carefully check all delegated acts (Brandsma, ). With the current lack of transparency surrounding the adoption process of delegated acts, no account is given to citizens and interest intermediaries – at least not by formal means.…”