Accidents in the Energy Sector and Energy Infrastructure Attacks in the Context of Energy Security

Abstract

The risks of technological accidents in the energy sector and their potentially disastrous effects have been analyzed over the past decades, and are nowadays generally recognized to constitute a key factor in an encompassing assessment of energy security. In contrast, the issue of intentional attacks on energy infrastructures has received increased attentionmore recently, particularly due to growing dependence of energy imports fromand transit routes through regions considered less reliable and politically stable. Both types of risks, however, illuminate different vulnerabilities. Therefore, the focus of the present analysis was on these two risk categories: accidents and intentional attacks in the energy sector. Risk assessment resultswere based on quantitative data from the databases ENSAD (Energy-related Severe Accident Database) and EIAD (Energy Infrastructure Attack Database). Evaluations examined similarities and differences between technological accidents and intentional attacks in terms of frequencies and consequences, considering time-series trends and regional patterns. A key difference is that accidents are typically rare and independent events, whereas intentional attacks are often multiple events and concentrated both in time and space, resulting in distinct hotspots. Concerning consequences, the severity distribution for accidents generally stretches over a broad range, with low-probability high-consequence events being an important factor of both energy chain performance and as a measure of risk aversion. On the other hand, these types of consequences are usually less important for intentional attacks because targeted energy infrastructures are often of “linear” nature (e.g. pipelines and transmission lines) that are difficult to protect and usually lead through remote areas with low population density. However, when frequently attacked substantial business and supply disruptions can occur. In summary, the joint analysis of accidents and intentional attacks provides a comprehensive and complementary approach on two types of risks that have rather different properties, but are essential in an energy security perspective.

A composite policy tool to measure territorial resilience capacity

“…They include country cluster (a 1 ), energy chain stage (a 2 ), infrastructure type (a 3 ), event chain sequence from 1 up to 5 (a 4-8 ) (see Table 1). Details on each of these attributes can be found in Burgherr et al (2015) and Burgherr et al (2017). The "evaluation" of energy accidents (decision in MCDA terms) is currently the number of fatalities (i.e., outcome) that each accident caused, clustered in one of three preferenceordered (from a low to high impact) classes, Cl 1 = 5 -10 fatalities (118 accidents); Cl 2 = 11 -20 fatalities (40 accidents); Cl 3 ≥ 20 fatalities (24 accidents).…”

“…These disruptions can affect energy systems as well as community resilience and they can be triggered by different causes, such as man-made (e.g., lack of maintenance), technological (e.g., collapses of an infrastructure) and natural (e.g., earthquake, floods), resulting in events such as explosions, fires and release of toxic substances. These detrimental happenings can have negative outcomes that can be characterized in multiple forms, including fatalities, injuries, evacuees, ban on consumption of food, release of toxic substances and economic losses (Burgherr et al, 2015, Sovacool et al, 2016. A few initiatives have been proposed to consistently collect information on accidents in the energy sector, by employing descriptors that include the location of the accidents, the type of energy chain and infrastructure as well as the type of detrimental events (Burgherr et al 2015, Sovacool et al 2015, Sovacool et al 2016.…”

“…These detrimental happenings can have negative outcomes that can be characterized in multiple forms, including fatalities, injuries, evacuees, ban on consumption of food, release of toxic substances and economic losses (Burgherr et al, 2015, Sovacool et al, 2016. A few initiatives have been proposed to consistently collect information on accidents in the energy sector, by employing descriptors that include the location of the accidents, the type of energy chain and infrastructure as well as the type of detrimental events (Burgherr et al 2015, Sovacool et al 2015, Sovacool et al 2016. Sovacool et al (2015) proposed a dataset of 1085 energy accidents for 11 energy systems over the period 1874-2014.…”

Mechanism of business entities innovative development management (organizational and economic approaches)

“…Placing the product / service in the market. [6,7,8] Thus, subprocesses of innovative development management reflect the combination of the main stages of innovation life cycle each of which occupies a certain place and the value in it, all of them are interrelated and complementary. The basis of our research is the enterprises of information and telecommunications field.…”

Risks in the energy sector: the analysis of management practices in the electricity market

“…The measures ensuring energy security of Russia includes measures on prevention of emergency situations through accidents or acts of sabotage at power facilities in peacetime and wartime and in case of their occurrence -measures for liquidation of emergency situations, security and protection of population, environment and decreasing material losses. [7][8][9][10][11] Energy security meets the needs of the individual, society, state in the field of energy. The material and technical basis for its provision is the fuel and energy complex (FEC) of the Russian Federation.…”