Access PointsAn Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

Ehrlich, Sean D.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737536.001.0001

Cited by 32 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…4 If we take in to account the complexity of the tax structure (revenue complexity) we have a lot of researches such as: Wagner (1976), Clotfelter (1976), Pommerehne and Schneider (1978), Munley and Greene (1978), Baker (1983), Breeden and Hunter (1985), Jones (1987, 2009), Berry andLowery -1987, Henrekson (1988), Misiolek and Elder (1988), Martinez-Vazquez, Harwood and Larkins (1992), Smolders (1994, 1995), Worthington (1995, 1996), Dollery and Worthington (1999), Franzese (2002), Hendrick (2002), Caroll (2009), Sanandaji and Wallace (2010), Ehrlich (2011), Brogan (2013) Lybeck and Henrekson (2014), Atkinson and Stiglitz 2015 etc. 5 In the case of income elasticity of the tax structure there are the following authors: Oates (1975), Craig and Heins (1980), DiLorenzo (1982), Baker (1983), Feenburgand and Rosen (1987), Hunter and Scott (1987), Misiolek and Elder (1988), Greene and Hawley (1991), • the flypaper effectwhere lump-sum intergovernmental grants have a stimulatory effect on public expenditure, 6 • renter illusion with respect to the property taxation which depends on the extent of property ownership in a given jurisdiction, 7 • debt illusion where public awareness of the extent public expenditure depends more on current taxation than debt financing, 8…”

Section: Fiscal Illusion Phenomenon From the Theoretical Point Of Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Phenomenon of Fiscal Illusion from Theoretical and Empirical Perspective: The Case of Euro Area Countries

Wildowicz-Giegiel¹,

Kargol-Wasiluk²

2020

ERSJ

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Purpose: The aim of the research is to build an index of fiscal illusion to assess the size of the problem in regards to the euro area countries in the period 2004-2016. Design/Methodology/Approach: The analysis of fiscal illusion phenomenon is based on critical analysis of public finance literature which helped in indicating the main sources of fiscal illusion and capturing its different dimensions. In addition, literature analysis enabled the selection of the most appropriate measures related to various aspects of illusion. Initially, the principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted to identify main factors which should be included in the formula of index. The selected factors were built on the basis of different measures and indicators that can be assigned to the selected dimensions of fiscal illusion. This allowed to construct the index of fiscal illusion. Findings: The authors noticed that economies characterized by a relatively high fiscal illusion and low quality of public finance may find it difficult to achieve fiscal sustainability in the long-term. In the analyzed period, the highest average value of the fiscal illusion index was recorded in Italy (the average FII 0,935), while the lowest in Estonia (the average FII 0,07). The results of the study revealed the significance of institutional determinants, which both influence the quality of public finance and the size of fiscal illusion. Practical Implications: The results are important not only for policymakers to understand the consequences of their decisions for public finance sustainability, but also for society, increasing its awareness of current tax burdens paid and benefits received. Originality/Value: The paper discusses the most important issues regarding fiscal illusion which seems to be obstacle in achieving public finance sustainability. The results of the research certainly enriched the existing knowledge on the phenomenon of fiscal illusion, its causes and ways of measurement.

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Section: Fiscal Illusion Phenomenon From the Theoretical Point Of Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Phenomenon of Fiscal Illusion from Theoretical and Empirical Perspective: The Case of Euro Area Countries

Wildowicz-Giegiel¹,

Kargol-Wasiluk²

2020

ERSJ

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“…For example, democracy cannot be denied to citizens living in democracies like Mexico, Canada, or the United States. However, because institutional contexts in democracies vary significantly in terms of their electoral systems, the party system, executive‐legislative systems, legal system, and so on, democracies have multiple veto players (Tsebelis ) or access points (Ehrlich ) that significantly affect the provision of either public or private goods. Therefore, whether democracy is a public or private good depends on institutional context.…”

Section: Institutional Sources Of Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, see Anderson and Guillory (); Anderson and Tverdova (); Bueno de Mesquita and others (); Dennis and Owen (); Ehrlich (); Karp and Bowler (); Miller and Listhaug (); Norris (); Powell (). For example, Bueno de Mesquita and others () explicitly argue that more democratic contexts (i.e., where a larger proportion of the electorate selects leader will see the provision of more public goods) lead to more public goods, as opposed to less democratic (i.e., where a small proportion of the electorate selects leaders), which produce more private goods that can only be enjoyed by a small elite.…”

Section: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Culture and Institutions Matter? Explaining the Sources of Cross‐National Regime Support

Peralta

2013

Politics & Policy

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What determines the level of popular support for regimes? There are two approaches to answering this question: one that emphasizes the role of culture in conditioning individuals' evaluations of political objects and another that emphasizes the importance of institutional arrangements in constraining and channeling individual behavior. I hypothesize that cross-national variation in regime support is, in part, a consequence of an interaction between cultural values and institutional arrangements. The results indicate that the impact of culture on regime support is mediated by the institutional context. It is this insight that can help us to better understand where regime support originates.

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“…The current literature on inequality and trade policy does not fully take this differing influence of constituents into account, particularly how the influence of elite networks, the lower class and the middle class, and interest groups, changes with inequality. While previous authors have looked at the impact of interest groups on trade policy (Ehrlich 2007(Ehrlich , 2011Fordham and McKeown 2003;Grossman and Helpman 2002), the interaction between constituent preferences, interest group influence, and trade policy (Bailey and Brady 1998), how inequality effects trade openness (Dutt and Mitra 2002;Dutt and Mitra 2006), the impact of trade on inequality (Puga 1999;Robertson 2000;Wood 1997), and the varying influence of those in the public given this inequality (Bartels 2008;Gilens 2005;Gilens and Page 2014;Hacker and Pierson 2010;Winters and Page 2009), there has not been a comprehensive explanation of how these factors interact to influence trade policy. Bailey and Brady (1998) do find US states with constituents who are economically homogeneous in terms of employment and union participation have senators who are more likely to abide by constituent preferences when it comes to trade policy votes, while states where constituents are more economically heterogeneous have senators that are more likely to defer to the preferences of interest groups.…”

Section: Trade Policy: Individual Preferences Disconnected From Policmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is evidence showing interest groups, in exchange for the support of politicians, can move trade policy closer to their preferences (Ehrlich 2007(Ehrlich , 2011(Ehrlich , 2018Grossman and Helpman 2002). Not only can interest groups obtain trade policy that is more favorable to them, they can get governments to actively defend their interests.…”

Section: Interest Group Influence On Trade Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Unequal Influence: The Impact of Inequality on Trade Policy

Fitzpatrick¹

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Trade was a central issue in the 2016 US presidential election, with both major party candidates debating how trade impacts American workers. However, the current literature on trade policy outcomes and inequality has insufficient measures of public opinion on trade. I examine the varying roles the public and interest groups play in the trade policy formation process as inequality changes in democratic societies. I expect, as inequality increases, the public and mass based interest groups will have less resources to expend on influencing policymakers. Also, as inequality increases economic elites' and business interest groups' resources will increase, and they will use these increased resources to take advantage of this gap in influence left by the public and mass based interest groups, to increasingly control policy. To test this theory, I examine the influence public opinion and interest groups have on trade agreement support among US senators and trade openness in Latin American States. The results are mixed, interest groups in favor of trade and against trade have influence over trade policy in the United States at all levels of inequality, while in Latin America the public views groups in favor of trade as becoming more powerful as inequality increases, and groups against trade becoming less powerful. In both cases, the results for the public point to the middle class, and not the upper class, having the most influence over policy, while those at the bottom have no influence.

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Access PointsAn Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

Cited by 32 publications

References 0 publications

The Phenomenon of Fiscal Illusion from Theoretical and Empirical Perspective: The Case of Euro Area Countries

The Phenomenon of Fiscal Illusion from Theoretical and Empirical Perspective: The Case of Euro Area Countries

Do Culture and Institutions Matter? Explaining the Sources of Cross‐National Regime Support

Unequal Influence: The Impact of Inequality on Trade Policy

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