Competitive Transformation of the Postal and Delivery Sector 2003
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-8915-4_2
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Access and (Non-)Uniform Pricing in the Postal Sector

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Cited by 9 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Previous papers have applied access pricing theory to the postal sector (such as Billette et al (2003b) and Crew and Kleindorfer (2002)), but few consider CDA. Billette et al (2004) explicitly consider both CDA and entrant's access at the same time.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous papers have applied access pricing theory to the postal sector (such as Billette et al (2003b) and Crew and Kleindorfer (2002)), but few consider CDA. Billette et al (2004) explicitly consider both CDA and entrant's access at the same time.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This mechanism partially eliminates subsidies that would otherwise promote inefficient entry and use of the PO facilities for downstream access at rates that do not cover marginal cost. Using a different approach, Billete de Villemeur et al (2003b, 2004 analyze the optimal access pricing rules when there is perfect and imperfect competition. Their findings suggest that many general principles governing access pricing in a competitive fringe setting remain applicable under imperfect competition.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The incumbent's pricing policy will be modified accordingly and one can expect a rather significant impact. The determination of the structure and the levels of pricing in settings that combine worksharing, access and bypass has been studied by Panzar (2005) as well as in our earlier papers (see Billette de Villemeur et al (2004, 2005). …”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We present a calibrated specification of Billette de Villemeur et al (2002,2003) based on real (albeit normalized) data from the French postal sector. For the time being, we study only the monopoly scenarios while leaving the empirical study of competitive settings presented in Billette de Villemeur et al (2004Villemeur et al ( , 2005 for future research. In addition to the scenarios considered in Billette de Villemeur et al (2002Villemeur et al ( , 2003 we consider a number of other regulatory scenarios: ECPR, price of single piece mail fixed at an exogenous ("affordable") level, profit maximization, etc.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%