2008
DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1149
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Worksharing: A Calibrated Model

Abstract: This paper studies the price structure in a postal sector with a monopolistic operator when customers can engage in worksharing. It presents simulation results obtained from an empirical model that is calibrated on data from the French postal sector. The optimal worksharing discount is significantly larger than the avoided costs. Consequently, the appropriate pricing structure differs markedly from the often recommended ECPR policy.

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Cited by 2 publications
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“…Article 1 of the Second Postal Directive (2002/39/EC) clarified the scope of price regulation, specifying that these prices: "shall take into account avoided costs with the standard services covering the complete range of features offered for the clearance, transport, sorting and delivery of individual postal items." Such pricing linked to avoided costs bound two market segments (single-item and bulk), which had different demand characteristics (such as price elasticity), and therefore limited the ability for postal operators to compete on a level playing field (see [10]). The Third Postal Directive loosened the avoided cost constraints on pricing; only the preamble now refers to this principle.…”
Section: Postal Policy In the Eumentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Article 1 of the Second Postal Directive (2002/39/EC) clarified the scope of price regulation, specifying that these prices: "shall take into account avoided costs with the standard services covering the complete range of features offered for the clearance, transport, sorting and delivery of individual postal items." Such pricing linked to avoided costs bound two market segments (single-item and bulk), which had different demand characteristics (such as price elasticity), and therefore limited the ability for postal operators to compete on a level playing field (see [10]). The Third Postal Directive loosened the avoided cost constraints on pricing; only the preamble now refers to this principle.…”
Section: Postal Policy In the Eumentioning
confidence: 99%