A Wittgensteinian Approach to Discerning the Meaning of Works of Art in the Practice of Critical and Contextual Studies in Secondary Art Education

Abstract

This article advocates an approach to critical and contextual studies in art education based on four references to meaning found in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language: meaning as use, meaning as rule-following, meaning as custom, and meaning as physiognomy. Each one makes up a different point on a compass for directing the will when discerning meaning in works of art. The will-toknowledge is directed towards forming judgments related to ponderable evidence of the contextual aspects of art, as revealed through meaning as custom, rule following, and use, all of which are reported through the third person. The will-to-understanding is directed towards making sense of imponderable evidence based on the physiognomic meaning of internal relationships of works of art, which are processed through first person responses. The self-as-will discerns continuity and discontinuity between ponderable and imponderable evidence for different aspects of meaning, and collates this knowledge and understanding to make judgments about a work's overall, multi-dimensional meaning. In attempting to see a work aright transpersonal explanations for context are combined with the personal understanding of critical studies, thus condensing meaning in works of art in such a way that students know how to go on. Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about. 2

Representing and practising meaningful differences in a well‐structured but complex art curriculum

“…With Tilghman, less ponderable evidence needs further justification in ponderable evidence. Cunliffe (2006) correspondingly identifies ponderable and less ponderable evidence as the text-and face-analogue meaning of art (see figure 4), a view consistent with Wittgenstein's (2001: 165-168) distinction between aspect seeing and seeing.…”

“…Such evidence is refined by what Gombrich (1996: 359) 12 calls the 'the logic of situations', a process which is aimed at eliminating implausible explanations from consideration when they are shown to be inconsistent with the sociocultural setting in which the art is made (Cunliffe 1998(Cunliffe , 2006.…”

“…An example of being able to discern such conventional meaning can be found in understanding Durer's painting, The Four Apostles: seeing that man who carries a large sword and a book as St. Paul rather than, say, Richard the Lionheart, requires a text-analogue approach (Cunliffe 2006). One could spend a lifetime looking at an Aboriginal Australian memorial pole without understanding its symbolic function, which can only be grasped indirectly, just as a text is read.…”

Forms of Knowledge in Art Education and the Corollary of Authenticity in the Teaching and Assessment of Such Forms of Knowledge

“…In recent years the boundaries of what constitutes knowing in secondary art education have moved from the exclusive modernist concentration on the teaching and assessment of procedural knowledge (which will be subsequently described as 'knowing how' to make art), to also engage with the separate but complementary domain of declarative knowledge (subsequently described as 'knowing that' about the meanings of works of art and art practices) [3].…”