A topological theory of fundamental concrete particulars

Giberman, Daniel

doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0432-7

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…Now, looking to protect PM from junk, Schaffer also argues that junk is metaphysically impossible because it is, according to him, "world-less." Bohn (2009aBohn ( , 2012 doubts the force of Schaffer's "world-less" critique of junk, and a number of others agree with Bohn on this score (Giberman, 2015b;. At any rate, the upshot for our purposes is this: to protect (contingent) PM from junk with respect to some world w, one need not argue that junk is metaphysically impossible or conceptually problematic; it suffices to argue that w is gunky.…”

Section: Why This Is Not Pedantrymentioning

confidence: 97%

“…But if a gunky world is indeed guaranteed not to be junky then, to the extent that it is plausible that the actual world is gunky, there is no threat from junk to PM, understood as a contingent theory of actual ontological priority. Now, looking to protect PM from junk, Schaffer also argues that junk is metaphysically impossible because it is, according to him, “world‐less.” Bohn (, ) doubts the force of Schaffer's “world‐less” critique of junk, and a number of others agree with Bohn on this score (Giberman, ; Tallant, ). At any rate, the upshot for our purposes is this: to protect (contingent) PM from junk with respect to some world w , one need not argue that junk is metaphysically impossible or conceptually problematic; it suffices to argue that w is gunky…”

Section: Why This Is Not Pedantrymentioning

confidence: 99%

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What it takes to be hunky

Giberman

2020

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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A world is gunky iff every object that exists according to it has others as proper parts. A world is junky iff every object that exists according to it is a proper part of some others. Several philosophers have followed (Bohn, 2009a) in then saying that a world is “hunky” just in case it is both gunky and junky. The present note explains a need to clarify the determinative criteria for being hunky. It then provides the needed clarification and explains why the issue, though subtle, is not merely pedantic.

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Section: Why This Is Not Pedantrymentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Why This Is Not Pedantrymentioning

confidence: 99%

What it takes to be hunky

Giberman

2020

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…I must confess, however, I know of nobody in the present literature who explicitly accepts all three views. Both Stuchlik () and Giberman (, ), for instance, seem sympathetic towards temporal gunk, and think worm‐theoretic perdurantism is compatible with it; but Stuchlik (2003, p. 310) does not seem to think temporal parts are more fundamental than the objects they are parts of, and Giberman () has previously defended a view on fundamental particulars which would be compatible with priority pluralism being false (see n. 40). This might well be evidence that metaphysicians implicitly recognize the tension between the three views.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…This, however, would not necessarily preclude there being some fundamental entities. Giberman (), for instance, has argued in favour of a topological conception of fundamental particulars, where what is fundamental are “fully connected” property instances which do not asymmetrically supervene on any other properties. This view is compatible with gunk, but it is obviously not a view on which objects themselves are fundamental.…”

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An Inconsistent Triad: Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism and (the Possibility of) Gunky Time

Taylor

2020

Theoria

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Priority pluralism, perdurantism and that temporal gunkwhere some interval of time is gunky iff every interval of it has a proper subintervalis at least metaphysically possible, are three commonly held views in contemporary metaphysics. However, there cannot be a temporally gunky world where objects perdure, and where there are mereological simples. Given thatas I will arguepluralists should be committed to atomism, and cannot plausibly revise their view to accommodate temporal gunk if they are perdurantists, pluralism is incompatible with the combination of temporal gunk and perdurantism. Therefore, priority pluralism, perdurantism and the possibility of temporal gunk are jointly incompatible, and at least one of these views must be false. Subsequently, it means that at least one of the following views must be true: priority monism or metaphysical infinitism; endurantism; and/or that time is atomistic. The triad's inconsistency, then, has some interesting metaphysical implications.

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“…In addition to displaying a mereological structure, concreta display a topological structure-this concrete entity is next to that one, these concreta are between those, and so on Giberman (2015). develops a concrete foundationalist thesis that aims to characterize the c-fundamental concreta in topological rather than mereological terms.6 For an alternative grounding-theoretic take on fundamentality, seeRaven (2016).…”

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Priority monism

Trogdon

2017

Philosophy Compass

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According to priority monism, there are many concrete entities and there is one, the cosmos, that is ontologically prior to all the others. I begin by clarifying this thesis as well as its main rival, priority atomism. I show how the disagreement between the priority monist and atomist ultimately turns on how the thesis of concrete foundationalism is implemented. While it's standard to interpret priority monism as being metaphysically noncontingent, I show that there are two competing, prima facie plausible conceptions of metaphysical necessity—the essence‐based and law‐based conceptions—on which it is reasonable to view its modal status differently. This, I suggest, is good for the priority monist—various objections to the thesis presuppose that it's metaphysically noncontingent, while there are arguments for the thesis that don't make the presupposition.

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A topological theory of fundamental concrete particulars

Cited by 9 publications

References 25 publications

What it takes to be hunky

What it takes to be hunky

An Inconsistent Triad: Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism and (the Possibility of) Gunky Time

Priority monism

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