An Inconsistent Triad: Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism and (the Possibility of) Gunky Time

Abstract

Priority pluralism, perdurantism and that temporal gunkwhere some interval of time is gunky iff every interval of it has a proper subintervalis at least metaphysically possible, are three commonly held views in contemporary metaphysics. However, there cannot be a temporally gunky world where objects perdure, and where there are mereological simples. Given thatas I will arguepluralists should be committed to atomism, and cannot plausibly revise their view to accommodate temporal gunk if they are perdurantists, pluralism is incompatible with the combination of temporal gunk and perdurantism. Therefore, priority pluralism, perdurantism and the possibility of temporal gunk are jointly incompatible, and at least one of these views must be false. Subsequently, it means that at least one of the following views must be true: priority monism or metaphysical infinitism; endurantism; and/or that time is atomistic. The triad's inconsistency, then, has some interesting metaphysical implications.