A Theory of Gender’s Role on Presidential Approval Ratings in Corrupt Times

Abstract

The rise of female chief executives appears to signal gender progress, but this may not be unequivocally so. This article advances a contextual theory for the role of gender on leaders’ approval ratings, a key measure of “success” and source of executive power. I argue that because of gendered expectations and discourse, female presidents will receive lower approval ratings in contexts of corruption. The study focuses on Latin America, known for its powerful, masculinist presidential regimes and its democratically elected female leaders. I first trace the gendered construction of President Michelle Bachelet’s image as an honest mother. Upon a presidential scandal, higher standards and gendered discourse resulted in deeply disappointed citizens, significantly undermining her popularity. Models of eighteen Latin American countries next reveal a negative impact of being a female—rather than a male—president on approval ratings. Marginal effects plots show that female presidents score worse than their male counterparts in contexts of at least one presidential scandal and higher executive corruption. This article contributes to the growing literature on gender and corruption. It also challenges some conventional wisdom on the pro-women consequences of female leadership in providing a more nuanced account of the role of gender in the executive branch.

Women Leaders and Pandemic Performance: A Spurious Correlation

“…The pandemic has raised women leaders’ profiles, but gendered double standards remain. Women governing during crisis face shorter tenures, harsher exits, and disproportionate blame compared with similarly situated men (O'Neill, Pruysers, and Stewart 2019; Reyes-Housholder 2019; Thomas 2018). Making women leaders into icons of coronavirus containment could heighten voters’ dissatisfaction with their performance as the pandemic lingers and even worsens.…”

The Language of Legacies: The Politics of Evoking Dead Leaders

“…Until recently, the American case has dominated the literature on executive approval. By calling attention to Argentina, we contribute to a growing literature on the relationship between the approval and power of chief executives in developing democracies (e.g., Reyes-Housholder 2019). We also examine more speeches over a longer time than most research examining leader rhetoric and executive approval.…”

Under the Microscope: Gender and Accountability in the US Congress

“…For example, women candidates and officeholders are often evaluated more harshly on the basis of their qualifications and receive less credit for their experience relative to men (e.g., Bauer 2020b; Fulton 2012; 2014). Women officeholders are also penalized more harshly than men for misconduct (Barnes, Beaulieu, and Saxton 2020; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018; Reyes-Housholder 2020), campaign negativity (Krupnikov and Bauer 2014), and low-quality constituency service (Costa 2020). Other research finds that women parliamentary leaders are evaluated more stringently for their party’s electoral performance (O’Brien 2015) and are more likely to experience political violence (Håkansson 2021).…”

“…Although constituents tend to evaluate legislators based on how well they provide issue representation (Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki 2021; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002), it is less clear whether this standard applies similarly to men and women legislators. Research in other contexts indicates that women politicians are held to different (and, usually, higher) performance and qualification standards than men (Bauer 2020b; Costa 2020; O’Brien 2015; Reyes-Housholder 2020), suggesting that policy performance may operate differently as a criterion for evaluating women and men legislators. To the degree that holding elected officials accountable for their policy decisions is a fundamental issue of democratic theory (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002, 127), identifying whether this relationship varies with the characteristics of officeholder gender has implications for normative and positive accounts of democratic performance.…”