A test for regulatory lag and the role played by periodic contract renewals in mitigating such lag in local cable franchise relationships

Zupan, Mark A.

doi:10.1007/bf00150294

Cited by 8 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Zupan concluded that operator opportunism and reneging were infrequent, however, and that unforeseen circumstances rather than opportunism were the primary motivation for operator-induced renegotiations. Finally, to test whether advantages possessed by incumbent cable operators allowed them to behave opportunistically at franchise renewal intervals, Zupan (1989b;1989c) compared a sample of 59 cable franchise renewal agreements with 66 concurrent initial franchises. Although only 7 of 3516 cable communities nationwide did not renew contracts with the incumbent supplier, suggesting a lack of bidding parity between incumbents and potential entrants at contract renewal, Zupan found that, out of six franchise terms examined, new and renewal contracts differed significantly only with respect to channel capacity and the price of the leading pay tier of service.…”

Section: Cable Televisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation

1996

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article reexamines the administered contracts approach to regulation in light of recent empirical research that establishes the importance of transaction-costs in the organizational choice and design decisions. After reviewing the fundamentals of transaction cost reasoning and the franchise bidding-versus-regulation debate, the study surveys the empirical literature on franchise bidding, contracting, and vertical integration. The implications of transaction-cost theories for current policies toward pubic utility regulation and deregulation are also addressed.

show abstract

Section: Cable Televisionmentioning

confidence: 99%