A Survey of Game Theory as Applied to Network Security

Roy, Subhadeep; Ellis, Charles D.; Shiva, Sajjan G.; Dasgupta, Dipankar; Shandilya, Vivek; Wu, Qishi

doi:10.1109/hicss.2010.35

Cited by 375 publications

(231 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…In previous work [19] game play method of finding the intruder were proposed based on the response and recovery method. The problem in that existing work is if the real header is misplayed the game in wrong method means the entire client under the network cannot access the data, so they can suffer the access of data, so it will be the great drawback from the existing work and study the various work from [20].…”

Section: Problem Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Game Theory for Network Security using IPDRS Engine

P¹,

Nadu²

2015

International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer and Comm

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Abstract:With the tremendous growth of network technology, network attackers are also rationally increased to disrupt the activities and hacking the data from the network users by the intruder. To provide the security from the intruder is most important one. Many researchers were proposed a different approach for providing security they does not tackle the problem, it leads an untruthful in the network. In existing system they propose a game based intrusion request and response process by game play of header node to access the data by their correct play, from this if the real header play it in wrong method means all the client user under the header also suffer from the access of the data. To tackle this issue we enhanced the game theory based on the individual play in the network to avoid the suffering of misplayed game played by the header using the IPDRS Engine.

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Section: Problem Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Game Theory for Network Security using IPDRS Engine

P¹,

Nadu²

2015

International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer and Comm

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“…26. The strategic component of attributing cyberattacks has been studied in the context of single attacks against specific systems using game theory (27)(28)(29)(30), but these models do not account for the larger sociopolitical landscape. This broader context has been studied qualitatively using a variety of models (15,31,32).…”

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame

Edwards

Furnas

Forrest

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Cyber conflict is now a common and potentially dangerous occurrence. The target typically faces a strategic choice based on its ability to attribute the attack to a specific perpetrator and whether it has a viable punishment at its disposal. We present a game-theoretic model, in which the best strategic choice for the victim depends on the vulnerability of the attacker, the knowledge level of the victim, payoffs for different outcomes, and the beliefs of each player about their opponent. The resulting blame game allows analysis of four policy-relevant questions: the conditions under which peace (i.e., no attacks) is stable, when attacks should be tolerated, the consequences of asymmetric technical attribution capabilities, and when a mischievous third party or an accident can undermine peace. Numerous historical examples illustrate how the theory applies to cases of cyber or kinetic conflict involving the United States,

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“…The game is non-cooperative, static, imperfect, complete information, and non-constant-sum game. There is no cooperation between the players (network security games fall under the category of non-cooperative games, as there is no cooperation between attacker and defender [22]). As a static game, each player has a pre-computed move list (each move denoted as a strategy) from which the best move is chosen to maximise their personal benefit.…”

Section: Game Theoretical Cost Benefit Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Traditional network security solutions lack a macro-level quantitative decision framework [22]. Various researchers have focused their work on utilising game theory in order to provide a holistic solution [15,31,12,7].…”

Section: Game Theory In Security and Malware Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additionally, Game Theory has been introduced in a number of occasions across the fields of computer and network security (e.g. [22,7]) in order to describe the interactions between an attacker and the defender and the ways their actions may affect each other. As malware acts based on inscribed behaviour coded by cyber criminals, approaching it as a threat agent on its own right under the premise of game theory becomes a reasonable assumption.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Game Theoretical Method for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Malware Dissemination Prevention

Spyridopoulos

Maraslis

Mylonas

et al. 2015

Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective

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A game theoretical method for cost-benefit analysis of malware dissemination prevention. Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective, 24 (4-6). pp. 164-176. ISSN 1939-3555 Disclaimer UWE has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material deposited and as to their right to deposit such material. UWE makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited.UWE makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.UWE accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an allegation of any such infringement. Abstract Literature in malware proliferation focuses on modelling and analysing its spread dynamics. Epidemiology models, which are inspired by the characteristics of biological disease spread in human populations, have been used in the past against this threat to analyse the way malware spreads in a network. This work presents a modified version of the commonly used epidemiology models SIR and SIS, which incorporates the ability to capture the relationships between nodes within a network, along with their effect on malware dissemination process. Drawing upon a model that illustrates the network's behaviour based on the attacker's and the defender's choices, we use game theory to compute optimal strategies for the defender to minimise the effect of malware spread, minimising at the same time the security cost. We consider three defence mechanisms, "patch", "removal", and "patch and removal", which correspond to the defender's strategy, used probabilistically with a certain rate. The attacker chooses the type of attack according to its effectiveness and cost. Through the interaction between the two opponents we infer the optimal strategy for both players, known as Nash Equilibrium, evaluating the related payoffs. Hence, our model provides a cost-benefit risk management framework for managing malware spread in computer networks. PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT. A Game Theoretical Method for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Malware Dissemination Prevention

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A Survey of Game Theory as Applied to Network Security

Abstract: Network security is a complex and challenging problem.

Cited by 375 publications

References 23 publications

Optimal Game Theory for Network Security using IPDRS Engine

Optimal Game Theory for Network Security using IPDRS Engine

Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame

A Game Theoretical Method for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Malware Dissemination Prevention

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