A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger

doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0293-9

Cited by 12 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…In the experiments reported here we present an inter‐generational version of the VBB experiment. The experimental approach is similar to that of Schotter and Sopher (2003, 2006, 2007) and also to the theoretical work of Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005) and Anderlini et al (2007) on dynastic games where economic agents have finite lives but play games of infinite duration with inter‐generational inter‐dependent utility functions.…”

Section: Payoff Table In Van Huyck Et Al’s (1990) Minimum Effort Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

Chaudhuri

Schotter

Sopher

2008

The Economic Journal

129

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We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the ‘Minimum Effort Game’ which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto‐ranked equilibria. The game is played by non‐overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter‐generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff‐dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge.

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Section: Payoff Table In Van Huyck Et Al’s (1990) Minimum Effort Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

Chaudhuri

Schotter

Sopher

2008

The Economic Journal

129

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“…We content ourselves with two brief comments on strategic communication (see Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005) and Anderlini et al (2008) for explicit models of intergenerational communication). First, we note that even if each player can communicate with his or her successor, it is an equilibrium for no player to transmit information to his or her successor.…”

Section: Bounded Memory and Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory

Bhaskar

Mailath

Morris

2012

The Review of Economic Studies

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We study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players. We assume that social memory is finite-every player, except possibly one, is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past. This class of games includes games between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, and games with overlapping generations of players. An equilibrium is purifiable if some close-by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents' payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently. We show that only Markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite. Thus if a game has at most one long-run player, all purifiable equilibria are Markov.

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“…Finally, this paper builds on our previous work on dynastic communication in Anderlini, Gerardi, andLagunoff (2007, 2008), Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005), and Lagunoff (2006). 2 These papers consider dynastic games in which messages are about the past history of play.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Communication and Learning

Anderlini

Gerardi

Lagunoff

2011

The Review of Economic Studies

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We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present and future decisions. Each player observes his own signal but does not directly observe the realized signals or actions of his predecessors. Instead, he must rely on cheap-talk messages from the previous players to fathom the past. Each player is therefore both a receiver of information with respect to his decision, and a sender with respect to all future decisions. Senders' preferences are misaligned with those of future decision makers.We ask whether there exist "full learning" equilibria -ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually place full weight on the true state. We show that, regardless of how small the misalignment in preferences is, such equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We also consider the case where all players have access to a mediator who can work across time periods arbitrarily far apart. In this case full learning equilibria exist.JEL Classification: C70, C72, C73, D80, D83.For simplicity, the state is assumed to be binary, taking values either 0 or 1 and each player/policy maker lives one period and chooses an action in the real line. Which action is more desirable depends on the value of the state. Since this is unknown, the best action depends on beliefs about the state. The optimal level of CO 2 abatement depends on the state of knowledge about how severe global warming really is.At the end of the period each player receives an informative but imperfect signal of the state in {0, 1}. These signals are i.i.d. across time. Each player observes his own signal but does not directly observe the realized signals or actions of his predecessors. Instead, he must rely on cheap-talk messages about past signal realizations from the previous players to fathom the past. Each player is therefore both a receiver of information with respect to his own decision, and a sender with respect to all future decisions.We consider two versions of this model. In one, communication is public. The t-th sender's message is directly available to all future policy makers. All messages are therefore publicly observed and common knowledge among all future decision makers. The public communication model is a natural benchmark if it is difficult or impossible for the t-th player to destroy the messages of prior generations.A second version of the model assumes private communication. That is, the t + 1-th receiver is the sole recipient of the t-th sender's message. Under private commu...

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A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games

Abstract: Dynastic repeated games, Private communication, Social memory, Folk theorem, C72, C73, D82,

Cited by 12 publications

References 35 publications

Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory

Communication and Learning

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