A Study on Cyber Security Threats in a Shipboard Integrated Navigational System

Sviličić, Boris; Rudan, Igor; Jugović, Alen; Zec, Damir

doi:10.3390/jmse7100364

Cited by 36 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Awan et al in Reference [26] have analyzed 59 documented accidents to better understand the vulnerabilities of Integrated Bridge System (IBS) components. Svilicic et al in Reference [27] present a study on the cyber security resilience of a shipboard Integrated Navigational System (INS) installed on a RoPax ship engaged in international trade. Wang et al in Reference [28] propose a secure relative integrated navigation method to counteract injected fault measurement attacks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Cyber Security Risks of the Cyber-Enabled Ship

Kavallieratos

Katsikas

2020

JMSE

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One aspect of the digital transformation process in the shipping industry, a process often referred to as Shipping 4.0, is the increased digitization of on board systems that goes along with increased automation in and autonomy of the vessel. This is happening by integrating Information Technology with Operation Technology systems that results in Cyber Physical Systems on which the safe operations and sailing of contemporary and future vessels depend. Unavoidably, such highly interconnected and interdependent systems increase the exposure of the vessel’s digital infrastructure to cyber attacks and cyber security risks. In this paper, we leverage the STRIDE and DREAD methodologies to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the cyber risk of Cyber Physical Systems on board digitalized contemporary and future ships. Further, we propose appropriate cyber security baseline controls to mitigate such risks, by applying a systematic approach using a set of criteria that take into account the security requirements; the cyber risks; the possible attacks; and the possibly already existing controls, to select from the list of controls provided in the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) overlay of the NIST Guide to ICS Security. The results are expected to support the decision-making and the design of a security architecture for the cyber-enabled ship.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Cyber Security Risks of the Cyber-Enabled Ship

Kavallieratos

Katsikas

2020

JMSE

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“…The authors of [10] revealed cyber vulnerabilities of the INS on a roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) type of vessel. The vulnerability analysis was carried out by using the Nessus Professional vulnerability scanner [39].…”

Section: Conflicts Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The INS, similarly to other marine systems on board and ashore, suffers from a number of cybersecurity vulnerabilities [10][11][12]. Further, several products have been developed to mitigate cyber threats against vessels [13,14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a Cyber-Physical Range for the Integrated Navigation System (INS)

Oruc

Gkioulos

Katsikas

2022

JMSE

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The e-navigation concept was introduced by the IMO to enhance berth-to-berth navigation towards enhancing environmental protection, and safety and security at sea by leveraging technological advancements. Even though a number of e-navigation testbeds including some recognized by the IALA exist, they pertain to parts only of the Integrated Navigation System (INS) concept. Moreover, existing e-navigation and bridge testbeds do not have a cybersecurity testing functionality, therefore they cannot be used for assessing the cybersecurity posture of the INS. With cybersecurity concerns on the rise in the maritime domain, it is important to provide such capability. In this paper we review existing bridge testbeds, IMO regulations, and international standards, to first define a reference architecture for the INS and then to develop design specifications for an INS Cyber-Physical Range, i.e., an INS testbed with cybersecurity testing functionality.

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“…The research described in [ 20 ] presents a study on the cybersecurity of integrated navigational system (INS), which interconnects ECDIS, AIS, radar systems, and other naval sensors. As in [ 13 ], the authors use a vulnerability scanner and interviews with the crew to examine the security resilience the ship.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Triggering Mechanism for Cyber-Attacks in Naval Sensors and Systems

Leite

Moraes

Albuquerque

et al. 2021

Sensors

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In the maritime sector, the integration of radar systems, Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) through digital technologies enables several benefits to maritime operations, but also make ships prone to cyberattacks. In this context, this work investigates the feasibility of an attacker using a radar system or AIS as open door to remotely send commands to a cyber threat hosted on a ship, even if the ship’s systems are air gapped—i.e., are not connected to other networks. The received commands are intended to trigger a cyber threat located in the ship. Although the literature covers several analyzes on cyber risks and vulnerabilities in naval systems, it lacks exploiting mechanisms capable of acknowledging attack commands received through radar and AIS. To this end, this work proposes a triggering mechanism that uses a template matching technique to detect specific patterns transmitted by the attacker to the ship’s radar or AIS. The results show the effectiveness of the proposed technique as a tool to acknowledge the received attack commands and activate a malicious code previously installed on the ship. In the case of attacks on a radar system, the accuracy achieved by the proposed method is 0.90. In the case of attacks on an AIS/ECDIS setup it presents an accuracy of 0.93. In both cases the proposed mechanism maintains the due safety against accidental attack activations.

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A Study on Cyber Security Threats in a Shipboard Integrated Navigational System

Cited by 36 publications

References 20 publications

Managing Cyber Security Risks of the Cyber-Enabled Ship

Managing Cyber Security Risks of the Cyber-Enabled Ship

Towards a Cyber-Physical Range for the Integrated Navigation System (INS)

A Triggering Mechanism for Cyber-Attacks in Naval Sensors and Systems

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