A study of photon emission from n-channel MOSFET's

Toriumi, Akira; Yoshimi, M.; Iwase, M.; Akiyama, Yutaka; Taniguchi, Kenji

doi:10.1109/t-ed.1987.23112

Cited by 169 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…This process is associated with a broad spectral light emission distribution. This light is reported to originate either from bremsstrahlung, [7][8][9] or from phonon assisted electron recombination with holes generated during impact ionization. 10 In recent studies, a combination of direct and phonon assisted intraband radiation 6,11 is suggested as the main light emission mechanism in reverse biased diodes.…”

Section: Spectral Characterizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spectroscopic identification of light emitted from defects in silicon devices

Rasras

Wolf

Groeseneken

et al. 2001

Journal of Applied Physics

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Section: Spectral Characterizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…6,9,12 In the saturation regime, light is emitted at the drain side of the transistor. Studying the light emission mechanism in these devices is considered as a valuable means to investigate device degradation and hot carriers distribution.…”

Section: B Saturated Nmosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectroscopic identification of light emitted from defects in silicon devices

Rasras

Wolf

Groeseneken

et al. 2001

Journal of Applied Physics

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“…First observed in p-n junctions under reverse bias conditions, it was later discovered that Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistors (MOSFETs) exhibit optical emission that is caused by similar effects [108,167,168]. Since then, this has been extensively used in IC failure analysis because of the close correlation between the electronic condition of the device and the generated photons.…”

Section: Photonic Emission In Cmosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Krämer

2016

It - Information Technology

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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“…Chynoweth and McKay 6 investigated light emission from reverse-biased Si p-n junctions. Toriumi et al 7 reported light emission at the drain edge for N-channel metal-oxidesemiconductor ͑MOS͒ transistors. DiMaria et al 8 studied light emission from both the thin metal counter electrode and the bulk of the oxide in MOS structures.…”

Section: ͓S0003-6951͑97͒04303-9͔mentioning

confidence: 99%

Observation of visible light emission from Co-silicided junctions with leakage current

Watanabe

Gotō

Nakamura

1997

Applied Physics Letters

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We have observed visible light emission from Co-silicided junctions by emission microscopy. It was found that leakage current across the junction was accompanied by weak emission of light arising from spots distributed spatially on the electrode. In addition, the emission characteristics depended on the annealing temperature of the metallization process. It can be concluded that a plausible leakage origin is anomalous diffusion of Co, resulting in a locally high electric field. We also measured the energy dependence of the emission intensity and found that the emission intensity increases with decreasing photon energy.

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A study of photon emission from n-channel MOSFET's

Cited by 169 publications

References 24 publications

Spectroscopic identification of light emitted from defects in silicon devices

Spectroscopic identification of light emitted from defects in silicon devices

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Observation of visible light emission from Co-silicided junctions with leakage current

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