2019
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3452977
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A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce: Job Task Allocation and Incentive Plan Design

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Contracted writers then directed their effort towards creative production, which is more effective than customer care effort at differentiating their works from other writers. Furthermore, this finding suggests that an increased incentive in one dimension of multiple tasks (i.e., creative productivity) may lead agents to decrease their efforts in the other performance dimension (i.e., customer care), echoing recent research in incentive design and effort allocation in multi-tasking settings (for example, Kim et al 2019Kim et al , 2020. In particular, Kim et al (2019) investigate the sales performance-moral hazard trade-off in response to multidimensional performance (acquisition and maintenance) incentives in a CRM setting.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 60%
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“…Contracted writers then directed their effort towards creative production, which is more effective than customer care effort at differentiating their works from other writers. Furthermore, this finding suggests that an increased incentive in one dimension of multiple tasks (i.e., creative productivity) may lead agents to decrease their efforts in the other performance dimension (i.e., customer care), echoing recent research in incentive design and effort allocation in multi-tasking settings (for example, Kim et al 2019Kim et al , 2020. In particular, Kim et al (2019) investigate the sales performance-moral hazard trade-off in response to multidimensional performance (acquisition and maintenance) incentives in a CRM setting.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 60%
“…Third, our work is related to the literature on incentive and productivity (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). More specifically, it contributes to the recent research on multi-dimensional effort in multitasking settings where multi-dimensional incentive design is crucial in inducing agents' effort allocation between tasks (Kim et al 2019(Kim et al , 2020. In our empirical setting, writers allocate their efforts between two tasks: maintaining creative productivity and providing customer care.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…In bank and insurance settings, salespeople are responsible for both customer acquisition and maintenance, but many organizations and industries follow a specialized hunter-farmer model (Palmatier et al 2007) with different employees responsible for customer acquisition (hunt) and customer retention/maintenance (farm). These questions of job design and compensation design are explored in depth in Kim, Sudhir, and Uetake (2019) through a structural model of multitasking behavior in the presence of perfect information.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%