A Stackelberg Analysis of the Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries

Long, Le Kim; Flaaten, Ola

doi:10.5950/0738-1360-26.2.119

Cited by 20 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…In this game, the coalition chooses its Stage 4 effort level before the singletons do. The Stackelberg game leads to the alternative payoff functions

λ (m) = r {(1 - β)}^{2} / 4 {(n - m + 1)}^{2}

and

κ (m) = r {(1 - β)}^{2} / 4 m (n - m + 1)

(Long & Flaaten, ). Without support, this game already leads to large coalitions with about half the number of players.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The way we model support does not require an outside agency that subsidizes the coalition as in Ansink and Bouma (2013) and Zavalloni, Raggi, and Viaggi (2019) or has agenda-setting power as in Ansink, Weikard, and Withagen (2019). 1 It also does not require commitment as in Long and Flaaten (2011) who consider supporting transfers by the coalition members to compensate singletons for joining the coalition. Rather, we model support in a sequential game following Ansink et al (2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Common pool resources with support

Ansink

Weikard

2019

Natural Resource Modeling

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“…In this game, the coalition chooses its Stage 4 effort level before the singletons do. The Stackelberg game leads to the alternative payoff functions

λ (m) = r {(1 - β)}^{2} / 4 {(n - m + 1)}^{2}

and

κ (m) = r {(1 - β)}^{2} / 4 m (n - m + 1)

(Long & Flaaten, ). Without support, this game already leads to large coalitions with about half the number of players.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Common pool resources with support

Ansink

Weikard

2019

Natural Resource Modeling

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“…Notably, the puzzle of small coalitions can be solved without the use of transfer payments. Transfer or "side" payments combined with asymmetric players is a frequently invoked and powerful method which increases the number of players for which cooperation can be sustained (Kaitala and Lindroos, 1998, Kennedy, 2003, Lindroos 2008, Pintassilgo et al 2010, Long and Flaaten, 2011, Ellefsen, 2012, Breton and Keoula, 2014, Walker and Weikard, 2014. However, transfers payments have met much resistance in the policy world in general (Folmer et al, 1993) and are not implemented in direct financial terms in fisheries agreements (Munro, 2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Further, the puzzle of small coalitions is solved without the use of sequential move games (e.g. Long and Flaaten, 2011) or alternative 5 solution concepts, such as farsightedness (e.g. Keoula, 2012, Walker andWeikard, 2014).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact Under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse

Walker

Weikard²,

Richter

2015

SSRN Journal

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Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are nonlinear in stock and find that Grand Coalitions can be stable for any number of players if freeriding results in a total depletion of the fish stock. The results thus show conditions under which a Great Fish War becomes a Great Fish Pact. However, this conclusion no longer holds upon dropping the standard assumption that payoffs are evaluated in steady states. If payoffs in the transition between steady states are included, the increased incentives to deviate offset the increased benefits from cooperation due to the presence of endogenous risk and the Great Fish Pact returns to being a Great Fish War.

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“…Recently, one of the most interesting avenues of research has been the application of coalition games (see Pintassilgo 2003 for an early contribution and Pintassilgo et al 2010 for a recent contribution). Perhaps the most relevant paper for the current study is Long and Flaaten [2011] who develop a Stackelberg coalition game.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Noncooperative Management of the Northeast Atlantic Cod Fishery: A First Mover Advantage

Bjørndal¹,

Lindroos²

2014

Natural Resource Modeling

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The point of departure for this analysis is Bjørndal and Lindroos (2012), who developed an empirical bioeconomic model to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of Northeast Atlantic cod. In their analysis, only constant strategies were analysed for noncooperative games. In this paper, non-constant strategies are considered. Moreover, the fishery in question is characterised by cooperative management. What may happen in the real world, is that one nation breaks the cooperative agreement by fishing in excess of its quota. Often, it takes time for the other agent to detect this and respond. In this paper, we allow this kind of delayed response into a two agent non-cooperative game so that, if country 2 exceeds its quota, there will be a time lag before this is detected by country 1; moreover, there may also be a delay until country 1 is able to respond. Results show that the outcome critically depends on the length of these two lags as well as initial conditions.

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A Stackelberg Analysis of the Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries

Cited by 20 publications

References 27 publications

Common pool resources with support

Common pool resources with support

The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact Under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse

Noncooperative Management of the Northeast Atlantic Cod Fishery: A First Mover Advantage

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