A spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution

Alves, Luciana Bastos; Monteiro, Luiz Henrique Alves

doi:10.1016/j.cnsns.2019.02.020

Cited by 14 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Evolutionary game theory was developed to overcome the drawbacks of traditional games and analyse game players with limited rationality and dynamic games [52][53][54]. Replicator dynamics identify how pure strategies that lead to changes in population share and evolve over time [55].…”

Section: Hypothesis and Model Establishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Zhou

Tang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

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Section: Hypothesis and Model Establishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Zhou

Tang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…Evolutionary game theory was developed to overcome the disadvantages of traditional game theory when analyzing the bounded rationality of players and the dynamic process of game playing [35][36][37][38][39]. In the process of coal-mine safety production in China, the players are bounded rational and they change their strategies dynamically by observing and comparing payoff with others and then adjust their strategies.…”

Section: Trilateral Game Model Of Coal-mine Safety Productionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Zhang

Dai

et al. 2020

Complexity

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In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.

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“…In recent years, with the rapidly improving computational facilities and algorithms, numerical simulation has achieved great success in econophysics, and the income distribution has been mimicked and studied with a series of effective methods [ 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 ]. In 2000, a statistical economic model was considered for a market where the total money of a fixed number of agents is constant, and the impact of the saving propensity of the agents upon the equilibrium probability distribution of money was studied [ 19 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In 2016, Rey et al performed Monte Carlo simulations and examined the properties of tests for spatial effects in Discrete Markov chain models of regional distribution dynamics [ 22 , 23 ]. In 2019, Alves and Monteiro developed a spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution, where the money does not disappear when an offer is not taken [ 24 ]. In 2020, Tian and Liu proposed an inhomogeneous agent-based model to study the emergence of income inequality, where individuals with varied qualities work, consume and invest [ 25 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lattice–Gas–Automaton Modeling of Income Distribution

Cui

Lin

2020

Entropy

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A simple and effective lattice–gas–automaton (LGA) economic model is proposed for the income distribution. It consists of four stages: random propagation, economic transaction, income tax, and charity. Two types of discrete models are introduced: two-dimensional four-neighbor model (D2N4) and D2N8. For the former, an agent either remains motionless or travels to one of its four neighboring empty sites randomly. For the latter, the agent may travel to one of its nearest four sites or the four diagonal sites. Afterwards, an economic transaction takes place randomly when two agents are located in the nearest (plus the diagonal) neighboring sites for the D2N4 (D2N8). During the exchange, the Matthew effect could be taken into account in the way that the rich own a higher probability of earning money than the poor. Moreover, two kinds of income tax models are incorporated. One is the detailed taxable income brackets and rates, and the other is a simplified tax model based on a fitting power function. Meanwhile, charity is considered with the assumption that a richer agent donates a part of his income to charity with a certain probability. Finally, the LGA economic model is validated by using two kinds of benchmarks. One is the income distributions of individual agents and two-earner families in a free market. The other is the shares of total income in the USA and UK, respectively. Besides, impacts of the Matthew effect, income tax and charity upon the redistribution of income are investigated. It is confirmed that the model has the potential to offer valuable references for formulating financial laws and regulations.

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A spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution

Cited by 14 publications

References 28 publications

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Lattice–Gas–Automaton Modeling of Income Distribution

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