2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.01.004
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A signaling theory of consumer boycotts

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Cited by 17 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 14 publications
(9 reference statements)
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“…Consequent to blame attribution and moral outrage (Bechwati & Morrin, 2007;Weiner, 2000), active groups of consumers engage in retaliatory actions via direct or indirect means (Grégoire, Laufer, & Tripp, 2010). These include negative word of mouth, vindictive complaining, switching to an alternative (Grégoire & Fisher, 2008) or calling for boycotts of the company's products (Braunsberger & Buckler, 2009;Heijnen & van der Made, 2012).…”
Section: Literature Review Crisis Attribution Emotional Reactions Amentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Consequent to blame attribution and moral outrage (Bechwati & Morrin, 2007;Weiner, 2000), active groups of consumers engage in retaliatory actions via direct or indirect means (Grégoire, Laufer, & Tripp, 2010). These include negative word of mouth, vindictive complaining, switching to an alternative (Grégoire & Fisher, 2008) or calling for boycotts of the company's products (Braunsberger & Buckler, 2009;Heijnen & van der Made, 2012).…”
Section: Literature Review Crisis Attribution Emotional Reactions Amentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Inevitably, this leads to moral outrage and results in consumers seeking to bring the company to justice for its immorality and misconduct (Fediuk et al, 2010; Lindenmeier et al, 2012). Following the unhappiness, active consumer groups advocate for retaliatory actions that include negative word of mouth, vindictive complaining, switching to an alternative, or calls for boycotts of the company’s products (Heijnen & van der Made, 2012).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, consider negative selection: when U IC is binding for the green …rm, its pro…t margins are decreasing in consumers' willingness to pay . 21 Therefore, the green …rm is better-o¤ the higher the share of low-valuation consumers and the lower the share of high-valuation consumers that it is able to serve. The opposite happens when DIC is binding for the brown …rm: its pro…t margins are increasing in , therefore this …rm is better-o¤ if it succeeds in serving an increasing share of high-valuation consumers and a decreasing share of low-valuation consumers.…”
Section: Consumers'self-selectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Their results show that feedback equilibrium is beneficial to the manufacturer, while is harmful to the retailer. Furthermore, studies on environmental consciousness can be found in Sengupta [31], Espínola-Arredondo and Muñoz-García [32] and Heijinen [33].…”
Section: Rq1mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To obtain demand functions in different channel structures, we employ a similar utility function established by Ingene and Parry [33], and the utility function has been widely utilized in marketing, economics, etc.…”
Section: The Model and Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%